diff --git a/data/rag_eval/results/plots/context_precision.png b/data/rag_eval/results/plots/context_precision.png index 8ed57ec..1d8acc1 100644 Binary files a/data/rag_eval/results/plots/context_precision.png and b/data/rag_eval/results/plots/context_precision.png differ diff --git a/data/rag_eval/results/plots/context_recall.png b/data/rag_eval/results/plots/context_recall.png index f9416a5..d51f262 100644 Binary files a/data/rag_eval/results/plots/context_recall.png and b/data/rag_eval/results/plots/context_recall.png differ diff --git a/data/rag_eval/results/results.json b/data/rag_eval/results/results.json index e530d2b..6daa167 100644 --- a/data/rag_eval/results/results.json +++ b/data/rag_eval/results/results.json @@ -6,5 +6,9 @@ { "context_precision": 0.968, "context_recall": 0.9359999999999999 + }, + { + "context_precision": 0.9819999999999999, + "context_recall": 0.9400000000000002 } ] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/test/benchmarks/rag/__pycache__/metrics.cpython-311.pyc b/test/benchmarks/rag/__pycache__/metrics.cpython-311.pyc index cf16d0d..6ab0425 100644 Binary files a/test/benchmarks/rag/__pycache__/metrics.cpython-311.pyc and b/test/benchmarks/rag/__pycache__/metrics.cpython-311.pyc differ diff --git a/test/benchmarks/rag/evaluation.py b/test/benchmarks/rag/evaluation.py index dc49e50..a4fb45b 100644 --- a/test/benchmarks/rag/evaluation.py +++ b/test/benchmarks/rag/evaluation.py @@ -16,23 +16,32 @@ from src.agent.llm import LLM from src.agent.knowledge import Store, Collection, Document, Topic -from test.benchmarks.rag.metrics import ContextRecall, ContextPrecision, EVAL_PROMPTS +from test.benchmarks.rag.metrics import ( + ContextRecall, + ContextPrecision, + ContextRelevancy, + Metric, + EVAL_PROMPTS +) GEN_PROMPT = { 'gemma2:9b': { - 'sys': textwrap.dedent(""" - You are a Cybersecurity professional assistant, your job is to provide an answer to context specific questions. - You will be provided with additional Context information to provide an answer. - """), - 'usr': textwrap.dedent(""" - Question: {query} - Context: - {context} - """) + 'sys': """ +You are a Cybersecurity professional assistant, your job is to provide an answer to context specific questions. +You will be provided with additional Context information to provide an answer.""", + 'usr': """Question: {query} +Context: +{context}""" } } +METRICS = { + 'context_precision': ContextPrecision, + 'context_recall': ContextRecall, + 'context_relevancy': ContextRelevancy +} + def init_knowledge_base(data: dict[str: list[Topic]], embedding_url: str) -> Store: """Creates a connection to the Vector Database and @@ -111,7 +120,7 @@ def gen_context_answer(question: str, llm: LLM): return pd.DataFrame(eval_data) -def evaluate(vdb: Store, qa_paths: list, endpoint: str, +def evaluate(vdb: Store, qa_paths: list, endpoint: str, metrics: list, generation_model: str = 'gemma2:9b', evaluation_model: str = 'gemma2:9b'): """Given the Vector Database and the synthetic Q&A dataset @@ -124,6 +133,24 @@ def evaluate(vdb: Store, qa_paths: list, endpoint: str, - Evaluating the full contexts-question-answer-ground_truths dataset. """ + if len(metrics) == 0: + raise ValueError('No metrics specified.') + + # Setup evaluation metrics + llm = LLM(model='gemma2:9b', client_url=endpoint) + eval_metrics: dict[Metric] = {} + for metric in metrics: + if metric not in METRICS.keys(): + raise ValueError(f'Invalid metric: {metric}.') + + m = METRICS[metric]( + EVAL_PROMPTS[evaluation_model][metric]['sys'], + EVAL_PROMPTS[evaluation_model][metric]['usr'], + llm + ) + eval_metrics[metric] = m + + # Evaluation Dataset eval_dataset = generate_evaluation_dataset( vdb=vdb, qa_paths=qa_paths, @@ -131,38 +158,24 @@ def evaluate(vdb: Store, qa_paths: list, endpoint: str, client_url=endpoint ) - # Setup evaluation metrics - llm = LLM(model='gemma2:9b', client_url=endpoint) - ctx_precision = ContextPrecision( - EVAL_PROMPTS[evaluation_model]['context_precision']['sys'], - EVAL_PROMPTS[evaluation_model]['context_precision']['usr'], - llm - ) - - ctx_recall = ContextRecall( - EVAL_PROMPTS[evaluation_model]['context_recall']['sys'], - EVAL_PROMPTS[evaluation_model]['context_recall']['usr'], - llm - ) - - # Run - recall = [] - for i, item in tqdm(eval_dataset.iterrows(), total=len(eval_dataset), desc='Measuring Context Recall'): - ctx = '\n\n'.join(item.contexts) - ans = item.answer - recall.append(ctx_recall.compute(ans, ctx)) - - precision = [] - for i, item in tqdm(eval_dataset.iterrows(), total=len(eval_dataset), desc='Measuring Context Recall'): - qst = item.question - ctx = '\n\n'.join(item.contexts) - ans = item.answer - precision.append(ctx_precision.compute(qst, ans, ctx)) - - metrics = pd.DataFrame({ - 'context_recall': recall, - 'context_precision': precision - }) + # Run Evaluation + results = {} + for metric_name, m in eval_metrics.items(): + results[metric_name] = [] + for i, item in tqdm(eval_dataset.iterrows(), total=len(eval_dataset), desc=f'evaluating {metric_name}'): + ctx = '' + for idx, chunk in enumerate(item.contexts): + ctx += f"[{idx}]: {chunk}\n\n" + + data = { + 'context': ctx, + 'question': item.question, + 'answer': item.answer, + 'ground_truth': item.ground_truth + } + results[metric_name].append(m.compute(data)) + + metrics = pd.DataFrame(results) return metrics, eval_dataset @@ -226,6 +239,7 @@ def plot_eval(plot_df: pd.DataFrame, name: str): ] metrics_df, eval_output_dataset = evaluate( + metrics=['context_precision', 'context_recall'], vdb=knowledge_base, qa_paths=synthetic_qa_paths, endpoint=OLLAMA_ENDPOINT diff --git a/test/benchmarks/rag/metrics.py b/test/benchmarks/rag/metrics.py index 46d8061..fa7e1ff 100644 --- a/test/benchmarks/rag/metrics.py +++ b/test/benchmarks/rag/metrics.py @@ -73,6 +73,36 @@ IMPORTANT: - Remember to follow the "Evaluation Guidelines" - Provide only the JSON string, do not provide any explanation.""" + }, + 'context_relevancy': { + 'sys': """Given a question and multiple chunks of context, you should analyze each chunk of context to determine its relevancy in answering the question. Use the following categorical scoring system for your classification: +- "great" (1): The context chunk is fundamental and essential to provide an answer. +- "good" (0.7): The context chunk is useful and relevant to the answer, but not fundamental. +- "inaccurate" (0.3): The context chunk is on the same topic as the answer but isn't useful in providing a response. +- "bad" (0): The context chunk is on a different topic and not relevant to the question. + +Your output should contain a list of categorical scores for each context chunk, formatted as a JSON string as follows: +{{"result": ["great" | "good" | "inaccurate" | "bad", ...]}} + +Evaluation Guidelines: +- Only provide the JSON string in the specified format. Do not include any additional text. +- Ensure your assessment is based on how well each context chunk aligns with the given question and supports the answer. +- If a context chunk lacks sufficient information to be relevant to the question, your response should be "bad". +- Ensure your evaluation reflects the necessity and relevancy of each context chunk in addressing the query.""", + 'usr': """Question: +{question} + +Contexts: +{context} + +Your output should contain a list of categorical scores for each context chunk, formatted as a JSON string as follows: +{{"result": ["great" | "good" | "inaccurate" | "bad", ...]}} + +IMPORTANT: +- Remember to follow the "Evaluation Guidelines" +- Provide only the JSON string, do not provide any explanation. + +""" } } } @@ -115,7 +145,15 @@ def query(self, sys_prompt: str, usr_prompt: str) -> str: def extract_response(response): """Extracts the json results from response""" try: - # TODO: validate response response type + result = json.loads(response)['result'] + if result is list: + # list of labels (ex. context relevancy) + values = [] + for label in result: + values.append(METRICS_VALUES[label] if label in METRICS_VALUES else 0) + return np.mean(values) + + # single label (ex. context precision) label = json.loads(response)['result'] return METRICS_VALUES[label] if label in METRICS_VALUES else 0 except JSONDecodeError: @@ -129,21 +167,30 @@ def extract_response(response): class ContextRecall(Metric): """Assesses how much the answer is based on the context""" - def compute(self, answer: str, context: str): + def compute(self, data: dict): """Computes context recall given answer and context""" return self.query( self.system_prompt, - self.user_prompt.format(answer=answer, context=context) + self.user_prompt.format(answer=data['answer'], context=data['context']) ) class ContextPrecision(Metric): """Assesses how much the context was useful in generating the answer""" - def compute(self, question: str, answer: str, context: str): + def compute(self, data: dict): """Uses question, answer and context""" return self.query( self.system_prompt, - self.user_prompt.format(question=question, answer=answer, context=context) + self.user_prompt.format(question=data['question'], answer=data['answer'], context=data['context']) ) + +class ContextRelevancy(Metric): + """Assesses how much relevant is the retrieved context to the query""" + + def compute(self, data: dict): + return self.query( + self.system_prompt, + self.user_prompt.format(question=data['question'], context=data['context']) + ) diff --git a/test/benchmarks/rag/tmp_eval_ds.json b/test/benchmarks/rag/tmp_eval_ds.json deleted file mode 100644 index 7002024..0000000 --- a/test/benchmarks/rag/tmp_eval_ds.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -{"contexts":{"0":["Broken Access Control: Description\nAccess control enforces policy such that users cannot act outside of their intended permissions. Failures typically lead to unauthorized information disclosure, modification, or destruction of all data or performing a business function outside the user's limits.","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed.","Broken Access Control: Developers and QA staff should include functional access control unit and integration tests.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: The application uses unverified data in a SQL call that is accessing account information:\npstmt.setString(1, request.getParameter(\"acct\"));\nResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );\nAn attacker simply modifies the browser's 'acct' parameter to send whatever account number they want. If not correctly verified, the attacker can access any user's account.\n"],"1":["Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: As there was no logging or monitoring of the system, the data breach could have been in progress since 2013, a period of more than seven years.\n Scenario #2: A major Indian airline had a data breach involving more than ten years' worth of personal data of millions of passengers, including passport and credit card data. The data breach occurred at a third-party cloud hosting provider, who notified the airline of the breach after some time.\n Scenario #3: A major European airline suffered a GDPR reportable breach.","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed.","Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: The breach was reportedly caused by payment application security vulnerabilities exploited by attackers, who harvested more than 400,000 customer payment records. The airline was fined 20 million pounds as a result by the privacy regulator."],"2":["Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Such flaws can be accidental (e.g., coding error) or intentional (e.g., a backdoor in a component). Some example exploitable component vulnerabilities discovered are:\n* CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\n * While the internet of things (IoT) is frequently difficult or impossible to patch, the importance of patching them can be great (e.g., biomedical devices).\n There are automated tools to help attackers find unpatched or misconfigured systems. For example, the Shodan IoT search engine can help you find devices that still suffer from Heartbleed vulnerability patched in April 2014.","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed.","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: If you do not know the versions of all components you use (both client-side and server-side). This includes components you directly use as well as nested dependencies.\n If the software is vulnerable, unsupported, or out of date. This includes the OS, web\/application server, database management system (DBMS), applications, APIs and all components, runtime environments, and libraries.\n * If you do not scan for vulnerabilities regularly and subscribe to security bulletins related to the components you use.\n"],"3":["Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: Security logging and monitoring came from the Top 10 community survey (#3), up slightly from the tenth position in the OWASP Top 10 2017.","Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: Logging and monitoring can be challenging to test, often involving interviews or asking if attacks were detected during a penetration test. There isn't much CVE\/CVSS data for this category, but detecting and responding to breaches is critical. Still, it can be very impactful for accountability, visibility, incident alerting, and forensics. This category expands beyond CWE-778 Insufficient Logging to include CWE-117 Improper Output Neutralization for Logs, CWE-223 Omission of Security-relevant Information, and CWE-532Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File.\n Description\nReturning to the OWASP Top 10 2021, this category is to help detect, escalate, and respond to active breaches.","Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: * Establish or adopt an incident response and recovery plan, such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-61r2 or later.\n There are commercial and open-source application protection frameworks such as the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set, and open-source log correlation software, such as the Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana (ELK) stack, that feature custom dashboards and alerting.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: A children's health plan provider's website operator couldn't detect a breach due to a lack of monitoring and logging. An external party informed the health plan provider that an attacker had accessed and modified thousands of sensitive health records of more than 3.5 million children. A post-incident review found that the website developers had not addressed significant vulnerabilities."],"4":["Injection: This is not a complete defense as many applications require special characters, such as text areas or APIs for mobile applications.\n * For any residual dynamic queries, escape special characters using the specific escape syntax for that interpreter. Note: SQL structures such as table names, column names, and so on cannot be escaped, and thus user-supplied structure names are dangerous. This is a common issue in report-writing software.\n * Use LIMIT and other SQL controls within queries to prevent mass disclosure of records in case of SQL injection.\n","Injection: Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting, CWE-89: SQL Injection, and CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.\n Description\nAn application is vulnerable to attack when:\n* User-supplied data is not validated, filtered, or sanitized by the application.\n Dynamic queries or non-parameterized calls without context-aware escaping are used directly in the interpreter.\n Hostile data is used within object-relational mapping (ORM) search parameters to extract additional, sensitive records.\n","Injection: Hostile data is directly used or concatenated. The SQL or command contains the structure and malicious data in dynamic queries, commands, or stored procedures.\n Some of the more common injections are SQL, NoSQL, OS command, Object Relational Mapping (ORM), LDAP, and Expression Language (EL) or Object Graph Navigation Library (OGNL) injection. The concept is identical among all interpreters. Source code review is the best method of detecting if applications are vulnerable to injections."],"5":["Broken Access Control: Developers and QA staff should include functional access control unit and integration tests.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: The application uses unverified data in a SQL call that is accessing account information:\npstmt.setString(1, request.getParameter(\"acct\"));\nResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );\nAn attacker simply modifies the browser's 'acct' parameter to send whatever account number they want. If not correctly verified, the attacker can access any user's account.\n","Injection: Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: An application uses untrusted data in the construction of the following vulnerable SQL call:\nString query = \"SELECT \\* FROM accounts WHERE custID='\" + request.getParameter(\"id\") + \"'\";\nScenario #2: Similarly, an application\u2019s blind trust in frameworks may result in queries that are still vulnerable, (e.g., Hibernate Query Language (HQL)):\nQuery HQLQuery = session.createQuery(\"FROM accounts WHERE custID='\" + request.getParameter(\"id\") + \"'\");\nIn both cases, the attacker modifies the \u2018id\u2019 parameter value in their browser to send: ' UNION SLEEP(10);--. For example:\nhttp:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountView?id=' UNION SELECT SLEEP(10);--\n","Injection: This changes the meaning of both queries to return all the records from the accounts table. More dangerous attacks could modify or delete data or even invoke stored procedures."],"6":["Insecure Design: Learn from mistakes and offer positive incentives to promote improvements. Secure design is neither an add-on nor a tool that you can add to software.\n Secure Development Lifecycle\nSecure software requires a secure development lifecycle, some form of secure design pattern, paved road methodology, secured component library, tooling, and threat modeling. Reach out for your security specialists at the beginning of a software project throughout the whole project and maintenance of your software. Consider leveraging the OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to help structure your secure software development efforts.\n","Insecure Design: How to Prevent\n* Establish and use a secure development lifecycle with AppSec professionals to help evaluate and design security and privacy-related controls\n* Establish and use a library of secure design patterns or paved road ready to use components\n* Use threat modeling for critical authentication, access control, business logic, and key flows\n* Integrate security language and controls into user stories\n* Integrate plausibility checks at each tier of your application (from frontend to backend)\n* Write unit and integration tests to validate that all critical flows are resistant to the threat model. Compile use-cases and misuse-cases for each tier of your application.\n * Segregate tier layers on the system and network layers depending on the exposure and protection needs\n* Segregate tenants robustly by design throughout all tiers\n*","Security Misconfiguration: The software is out of date or vulnerable (see A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components).\n Without a concerted, repeatable application security configuration process, systems are at a higher risk.\n How to Prevent\nSecure installation processes should be implemented, including:\n* A repeatable hardening process makes it fast and easy to deploy another environment that is appropriately locked down. Development, QA, and production environments should all be configured identically, with different credentials used in each environment."],"7":["Injection: Hostile data is directly used or concatenated. The SQL or command contains the structure and malicious data in dynamic queries, commands, or stored procedures.\n Some of the more common injections are SQL, NoSQL, OS command, Object Relational Mapping (ORM), LDAP, and Expression Language (EL) or Object Graph Navigation Library (OGNL) injection. The concept is identical among all interpreters. Source code review is the best method of detecting if applications are vulnerable to injections.","Injection: Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting, CWE-89: SQL Injection, and CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.\n Description\nAn application is vulnerable to attack when:\n* User-supplied data is not validated, filtered, or sanitized by the application.\n Dynamic queries or non-parameterized calls without context-aware escaping are used directly in the interpreter.\n Hostile data is used within object-relational mapping (ORM) search parameters to extract additional, sensitive records.\n","Injection: Automated testing of all parameters, headers, URL, cookies, JSON, SOAP, and XML data inputs is strongly encouraged. Organizations can include static (SAST), dynamic (DAST), and interactive (IAST) application security testing tools into the CI\/CD pipeline to identify introduced injection flaws before production deployment.\n How to Prevent\nPreventing injection requires keeping data separate from commands and queries:\n* The preferred option is to use a safe API, which avoids using the interpreter entirely, provides a parameterized interface, or migrates to Object Relational Mapping Tools (ORMs).Note: Even when parameterized, stored procedures can still introduce SQL injection if PL\/SQL or T-SQL concatenates queries and data or executes hostile data with EXECUTE IMMEDIATE or exec().\n * Use positive server-side input validation."],"8":["Injection: This changes the meaning of both queries to return all the records from the accounts table. More dangerous attacks could modify or delete data or even invoke stored procedures.","Cryptographic Failures: An attacker monitors network traffic (e.g., at an insecure wireless network), downgrades connections from HTTPS to HTTP, intercepts requests, and steals the user's session cookie. The attacker then replays this cookie and hijacks the user's (authenticated) session, accessing or modifying the user's private data. Instead of the above they could alter all transported data, e.g., the recipient of a money transfer.\n Scenario #3: The password database uses unsalted or simple hashes to store everyone's passwords. A file upload flaw allows an attacker to retrieve the password database.","Injection: Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: An application uses untrusted data in the construction of the following vulnerable SQL call:\nString query = \"SELECT \\* FROM accounts WHERE custID='\" + request.getParameter(\"id\") + \"'\";\nScenario #2: Similarly, an application\u2019s blind trust in frameworks may result in queries that are still vulnerable, (e.g., Hibernate Query Language (HQL)):\nQuery HQLQuery = session.createQuery(\"FROM accounts WHERE custID='\" + request.getParameter(\"id\") + \"'\");\nIn both cases, the attacker modifies the \u2018id\u2019 parameter value in their browser to send: ' UNION SLEEP(10);--. For example:\nhttp:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountView?id=' UNION SELECT SLEEP(10);--\n"],"9":["Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed.","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Such flaws can be accidental (e.g., coding error) or intentional (e.g., a backdoor in a component). Some example exploitable component vulnerabilities discovered are:\n* CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\n * While the internet of things (IoT) is frequently difficult or impossible to patch, the importance of patching them can be great (e.g., biomedical devices).\n There are automated tools to help attackers find unpatched or misconfigured systems. For example, the Shodan IoT search engine can help you find devices that still suffer from Heartbleed vulnerability patched in April 2014.","Security Misconfiguration: Moving up from #6 in the previous edition, 90% of applications were tested for some form of misconfiguration, with an average incidence rate of 4.%, and over 208k occurrences of a Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) in this risk category. With more shifts into highly configurable software, it's not surprising to see this category move up. Notable CWEs included are CWE-16 Configuration and CWE-611 Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference.\n Description\nThe application might be vulnerable if the application is:\n* Missing appropriate security hardening across any part of the application stack or improperly configured permissions on cloud services.\n * Unnecessary features are enabled or installed (e.g., unnecessary ports, services, pages, accounts, or privileges).\n"],"10":["Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed.","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Such flaws can be accidental (e.g., coding error) or intentional (e.g., a backdoor in a component). Some example exploitable component vulnerabilities discovered are:\n* CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\n * While the internet of things (IoT) is frequently difficult or impossible to patch, the importance of patching them can be great (e.g., biomedical devices).\n There are automated tools to help attackers find unpatched or misconfigured systems. For example, the Shodan IoT search engine can help you find devices that still suffer from Heartbleed vulnerability patched in April 2014.","Injection: Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: An application uses untrusted data in the construction of the following vulnerable SQL call:\nString query = \"SELECT \\* FROM accounts WHERE custID='\" + request.getParameter(\"id\") + \"'\";\nScenario #2: Similarly, an application\u2019s blind trust in frameworks may result in queries that are still vulnerable, (e.g., Hibernate Query Language (HQL)):\nQuery HQLQuery = session.createQuery(\"FROM accounts WHERE custID='\" + request.getParameter(\"id\") + \"'\");\nIn both cases, the attacker modifies the \u2018id\u2019 parameter value in their browser to send: ' UNION SLEEP(10);--. For example:\nhttp:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountView?id=' UNION SELECT SLEEP(10);--\n"],"11":["Identification and Authentication Failures: In that case, the application can be used as a password oracle to determine if the credentials are valid.\n Scenario #2: Most authentication attacks occur due to the continued use of passwords as a sole factor. Once considered best practices, password rotation and complexity requirements encourage users to use and reuse weak passwords. Organizations are recommended to stop these practices per NIST 800-63 and use multi-factor authentication.\n Scenario #3: Application session timeouts aren't set correctly.","Cryptographic Failures: Is an insecure mode of operation such as ECB in use? Is encryption used when authenticated encryption is more appropriate?\n* Are passwords being used as cryptographic keys in absence of a password base key derivation function?\n * Is randomness used for cryptographic purposes that was not designed to meet cryptographic requirements? Even if the correct function is chosen, does it need to be seeded by the developer, and if not, has the developer over-written the strong seeding functionality built into it with a seed that lacks sufficient entropy\/unpredictability?\n","Identification and Authentication Failures: * Do not ship or deploy with any default credentials, particularly for admin users.\n Implement weak password checks, such as testing new or changed passwords against the top 10,000 worst passwords list.\n * Align password length, complexity, and rotation policies with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-63b's guidelines in section 5.1.1 for Memorized Secrets or other modern, evidence-based password policies.\n * Ensure registration, credential recovery, and API pathways are hardened against account enumeration attacks by using the same messages for all outcomes.\n * Limit or increasingly delay failed login attempts, but be careful not to create a denial of service scenario."],"12":["Cryptographic Failures: * Don't store sensitive data unnecessarily. Discard it as soon as possible or use PCI DSS compliant tokenization or even truncation. Data that is not retained cannot be stolen.\n * Make sure to encrypt all sensitive data at rest.\n * Ensure up-to-date and strong standard algorithms, protocols, and keys are in place; use proper key management.\n","Cryptographic Failures: Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded Password, CWE-327: Broken or Risky Crypto Algorithm, and CWE-331 Insufficient Entropy.\n Description\nThe first thing is to determine the protection needs of data in transit and at rest. For example, passwords, credit card numbers, health records, personal information, and business secrets require extra protection, mainly if that data falls under privacy laws, e.g., EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), or regulations, e.g., financial data protection such as PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS).","Insecure Design: Requirements and Resource Management\nCollect and negotiate the business requirements for an application with the business, including the protection requirements concerning confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity of all data assets and the expected business logic. Take into account how exposed your application will be and if you need segregation of tenants (additionally to access control). Compile the technical requirements, including functional and non-functional security requirements. Plan and negotiate the budget covering all design, build, testing, and operation, including security activities.\n Secure Design\nSecure design is a culture and methodology that constantly evaluates threats and ensures that code is robustly designed and tested to prevent known attack methods."],"13":["Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: Appropriate alerting thresholds and response escalation processes are not in place or effective.\n * Penetration testing and scans by dynamic application security testing (DAST) tools (such as OWASP ZAP) do not trigger alerts.\n The application cannot detect, escalate, or alert for active attacks in real-time or near real-time.\n You are vulnerable to information leakage by making logging and alerting events visible to a user or an attacker (see A01:2021-Broken Access Control).\n How to Prevent\nDevelopers should implement some or all the following controls, depending on the risk of the application:\n*","Broken Access Control: Developers and QA staff should include functional access control unit and integration tests.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: The application uses unverified data in a SQL call that is accessing account information:\npstmt.setString(1, request.getParameter(\"acct\"));\nResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );\nAn attacker simply modifies the browser's 'acct' parameter to send whatever account number they want. If not correctly verified, the attacker can access any user's account.\n","Injection: Automated testing of all parameters, headers, URL, cookies, JSON, SOAP, and XML data inputs is strongly encouraged. Organizations can include static (SAST), dynamic (DAST), and interactive (IAST) application security testing tools into the CI\/CD pipeline to identify introduced injection flaws before production deployment.\n How to Prevent\nPreventing injection requires keeping data separate from commands and queries:\n* The preferred option is to use a safe API, which avoids using the interpreter entirely, provides a parameterized interface, or migrates to Object Relational Mapping Tools (ORMs).Note: Even when parameterized, stored procedures can still introduce SQL injection if PL\/SQL or T-SQL concatenates queries and data or executes hostile data with EXECUTE IMMEDIATE or exec().\n * Use positive server-side input validation."],"14":["Injection: Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-79: Cross-site Scripting, CWE-89: SQL Injection, and CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.\n Description\nAn application is vulnerable to attack when:\n* User-supplied data is not validated, filtered, or sanitized by the application.\n Dynamic queries or non-parameterized calls without context-aware escaping are used directly in the interpreter.\n Hostile data is used within object-relational mapping (ORM) search parameters to extract additional, sensitive records.\n","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Prefer signed packages to reduce the chance of including a modified, malicious component (See A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures).\n * Monitor for libraries and components that are unmaintained or do not create security patches for older versions. If patching is not possible, consider deploying a virtual patch to monitor, detect, or protect against the discovered issue.\n Every organization must ensure an ongoing plan for monitoring, triaging, and applying updates or configuration changes for the lifetime of the application or portfolio.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: Components typically run with the same privileges as the application itself, so flaws in any component can result in serious impact.","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Such flaws can be accidental (e.g., coding error) or intentional (e.g., a backdoor in a component). Some example exploitable component vulnerabilities discovered are:\n* CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\n * While the internet of things (IoT) is frequently difficult or impossible to patch, the importance of patching them can be great (e.g., biomedical devices).\n There are automated tools to help attackers find unpatched or misconfigured systems. For example, the Shodan IoT search engine can help you find devices that still suffer from Heartbleed vulnerability patched in April 2014."],"15":["Cryptographic Failures: Shifting up one position to #2, previously known as Sensitive Data Exposure, which is more of a broad symptom rather than a root cause, the focus is on failures related to cryptography (or lack thereof). Which often lead to exposure of sensitive data.","Cryptographic Failures: Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded Password, CWE-327: Broken or Risky Crypto Algorithm, and CWE-331 Insufficient Entropy.\n Description\nThe first thing is to determine the protection needs of data in transit and at rest. For example, passwords, credit card numbers, health records, personal information, and business secrets require extra protection, mainly if that data falls under privacy laws, e.g., EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), or regulations, e.g., financial data protection such as PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS).","Cryptographic Failures: * Are deprecated hash functions such as MD5 or SHA1 in use, or are non-cryptographic hash functions used when cryptographic hash functions are needed?\n * Are deprecated cryptographic padding methods such as PKCS number 1 v1.5 in use?\n * Are cryptographic error messages or side channel information exploitable, for example in the form of padding oracle attacks?\n See ASVS Crypto (V7), Data Protection (V9), and SSL\/TLS (V10)\nHow to Prevent\nDo the following, at a minimum, and consult the references:\n* Classify data processed, stored, or transmitted by an application. Identify which data is sensitive according to privacy laws, regulatory requirements, or business needs.\n"],"16":["Insecure Design: Learn from mistakes and offer positive incentives to promote improvements. Secure design is neither an add-on nor a tool that you can add to software.\n Secure Development Lifecycle\nSecure software requires a secure development lifecycle, some form of secure design pattern, paved road methodology, secured component library, tooling, and threat modeling. Reach out for your security specialists at the beginning of a software project throughout the whole project and maintenance of your software. Consider leveraging the OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to help structure your secure software development efforts.\n","Insecure Design: How to Prevent\n* Establish and use a secure development lifecycle with AppSec professionals to help evaluate and design security and privacy-related controls\n* Establish and use a library of secure design patterns or paved road ready to use components\n* Use threat modeling for critical authentication, access control, business logic, and key flows\n* Integrate security language and controls into user stories\n* Integrate plausibility checks at each tier of your application (from frontend to backend)\n* Write unit and integration tests to validate that all critical flows are resistant to the threat model. Compile use-cases and misuse-cases for each tier of your application.\n * Segregate tier layers on the system and network layers depending on the exposure and protection needs\n* Segregate tenants robustly by design throughout all tiers\n*","Security Misconfiguration: The software is out of date or vulnerable (see A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components).\n Without a concerted, repeatable application security configuration process, systems are at a higher risk.\n How to Prevent\nSecure installation processes should be implemented, including:\n* A repeatable hardening process makes it fast and easy to deploy another environment that is appropriately locked down. Development, QA, and production environments should all be configured identically, with different credentials used in each environment."],"17":["Broken Access Control: Except for public resources, deny by default.\n Implement access control mechanisms once and re-use them throughout the application, including minimizing Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) usage.\n * Model access controls should enforce record ownership rather than accepting that the user can create, read, update, or delete any record.\n Unique application business limit requirements should be enforced by domain models.\n * Disable web server directory listing and ensure file metadata (e.g., .git) and backup files are not present within web roots.\n","Broken Access Control: Developers and QA staff should include functional access control unit and integration tests.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: The application uses unverified data in a SQL call that is accessing account information:\npstmt.setString(1, request.getParameter(\"acct\"));\nResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );\nAn attacker simply modifies the browser's 'acct' parameter to send whatever account number they want. If not correctly verified, the attacker can access any user's account.\n","Broken Access Control: Acting as a user without being logged in or acting as an admin when logged in as a user.\n * Metadata manipulation, such as replaying or tampering with a JSON Web Token (JWT) access control token, or a cookie or hidden field manipulated to elevate privileges or abusing JWT invalidation.\n * CORS misconfiguration allows API access from unauthorized\/untrusted origins.\n * Force browsing to authenticated pages as an unauthenticated user or to privileged pages as a standard user.\n How to Prevent\nAccess control is only effective in trusted server-side code or server-less API, where the attacker cannot modify the access control check or metadata.\n"],"18":["Software and Data Integrity Failures: Being functional programmers, they tried to ensure that their code is immutable. The solution they came up with is serializing the user state and passing it back and forth with each request. An attacker notices the \"rO0\" Java object signature (in base64) and uses the Java Serial Killer tool to gain remote code execution on the application server.\n","Security Misconfiguration: Suppose one of these applications is the admin console, and default accounts weren't changed. In that case, the attacker logs in with default passwords and takes over.\n Scenario #2: Directory listing is not disabled on the server. An attacker discovers they can simply list directories. The attacker finds and downloads the compiled Java classes, which they decompile and reverse engineer to view the code.","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Such flaws can be accidental (e.g., coding error) or intentional (e.g., a backdoor in a component). Some example exploitable component vulnerabilities discovered are:\n* CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\n * While the internet of things (IoT) is frequently difficult or impossible to patch, the importance of patching them can be great (e.g., biomedical devices).\n There are automated tools to help attackers find unpatched or misconfigured systems. For example, the Shodan IoT search engine can help you find devices that still suffer from Heartbleed vulnerability patched in April 2014."],"19":["Insecure Design: There is a difference between insecure design and insecure implementation. We differentiate between design flaws and implementation defects for a reason, they have different root causes and remediation. A secure design can still have implementation defects leading to vulnerabilities that may be exploited. An insecure design cannot be fixed by a perfect implementation as by definition, needed security controls were never created to defend against specific attacks. One of the factors that contribute to insecure design is the lack of business risk profiling inherent in the software or system being developed, and thus the failure to determine what level of security design is required.\n","Insecure Design: A new category for 2021 focuses on risks related to design and architectural flaws, with a call for more use of threat modeling, secure design patterns, and reference architectures. As a community we need to move beyond \"shift-left\" in the coding space to pre-code activities that are critical for the principles of Secure by Design. Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) include CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information, CWE-256: Unprotected Storage of Credentials, CWE-501: Trust Boundary Violation, and CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials.\n Description\nInsecure design is a broad category representing different weaknesses, expressed as \u201cmissing or ineffective control design.\u201d Insecure design is not the source for all other Top 10 risk categories.","Cryptographic Failures: Is an insecure mode of operation such as ECB in use? Is encryption used when authenticated encryption is more appropriate?\n* Are passwords being used as cryptographic keys in absence of a password base key derivation function?\n * Is randomness used for cryptographic purposes that was not designed to meet cryptographic requirements? Even if the correct function is chosen, does it need to be seeded by the developer, and if not, has the developer over-written the strong seeding functionality built into it with a seed that lacks sufficient entropy\/unpredictability?\n"],"20":["Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: Appropriate alerting thresholds and response escalation processes are not in place or effective.\n * Penetration testing and scans by dynamic application security testing (DAST) tools (such as OWASP ZAP) do not trigger alerts.\n The application cannot detect, escalate, or alert for active attacks in real-time or near real-time.\n You are vulnerable to information leakage by making logging and alerting events visible to a user or an attacker (see A01:2021-Broken Access Control).\n How to Prevent\nDevelopers should implement some or all the following controls, depending on the risk of the application:\n*","Broken Access Control: * Log access control failures, alert admins when appropriate (e.g., repeated failures).\n Rate limit API and controller access to minimize the harm from automated attack tooling.\n * Stateful session identifiers should be invalidated on the server after logout. Stateless JWT tokens should rather be short-lived so that the window of opportunity for an attacker is minimized. For longer lived JWTs it's highly recommended to follow the OAuth standards to revoke access.\n","Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF): As modern web applications provide end-users with convenient features, fetching a URL becomes a common scenario. As a result, the incidence of SSRF is increasing. Also, the severity of SSRF is becoming higher due to cloud services and the complexity of architectures.\n How to Prevent\nDevelopers can prevent SSRF by implementing some or all the following defense in depth controls:\nFrom Network layer\n* Segment remote resource access functionality in separate networks to reduce the impact of SSRF\n* Enforce \u201cdeny by default\u201d firewall policies or network access control rules to block all but essential intranet traffic."],"21":["Security Misconfiguration: Suppose one of these applications is the admin console, and default accounts weren't changed. In that case, the attacker logs in with default passwords and takes over.\n Scenario #2: Directory listing is not disabled on the server. An attacker discovers they can simply list directories. The attacker finds and downloads the compiled Java classes, which they decompile and reverse engineer to view the code.","Security Misconfiguration: * Default accounts and their passwords are still enabled and unchanged.\n * Error handling reveals stack traces or other overly informative error messages to users.\n * For upgraded systems, the latest security features are disabled or not configured securely.\n The security settings in the application servers, application frameworks (e.g., Struts, Spring, ASP.NET), libraries, databases, etc., are not set to secure values.\n The server does not send security headers or directives, or they are not set to secure values.\n","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed."],"22":["Insecure Design: Threat modeling should be integrated into refinement sessions (or similar activities); look for changes in data flows and access control or other security controls. In the user story development determine the correct flow and failure states, ensure they are well understood and agreed upon by responsible and impacted parties. Analyze assumptions and conditions for expected and failure flows, ensure they are still accurate and desirable. Determine how to validate the assumptions and enforce conditions needed for proper behaviors. Ensure the results are documented in the user story.","Insecure Design: How to Prevent\n* Establish and use a secure development lifecycle with AppSec professionals to help evaluate and design security and privacy-related controls\n* Establish and use a library of secure design patterns or paved road ready to use components\n* Use threat modeling for critical authentication, access control, business logic, and key flows\n* Integrate security language and controls into user stories\n* Integrate plausibility checks at each tier of your application (from frontend to backend)\n* Write unit and integration tests to validate that all critical flows are resistant to the threat model. Compile use-cases and misuse-cases for each tier of your application.\n * Segregate tier layers on the system and network layers depending on the exposure and protection needs\n* Segregate tenants robustly by design throughout all tiers\n*","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed."],"23":["Cryptographic Failures: Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded Password, CWE-327: Broken or Risky Crypto Algorithm, and CWE-331 Insufficient Entropy.\n Description\nThe first thing is to determine the protection needs of data in transit and at rest. For example, passwords, credit card numbers, health records, personal information, and business secrets require extra protection, mainly if that data falls under privacy laws, e.g., EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), or regulations, e.g., financial data protection such as PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS).","Cryptographic Failures: Is an insecure mode of operation such as ECB in use? Is encryption used when authenticated encryption is more appropriate?\n* Are passwords being used as cryptographic keys in absence of a password base key derivation function?\n * Is randomness used for cryptographic purposes that was not designed to meet cryptographic requirements? Even if the correct function is chosen, does it need to be seeded by the developer, and if not, has the developer over-written the strong seeding functionality built into it with a seed that lacks sufficient entropy\/unpredictability?\n","Identification and Authentication Failures: Permits brute force or other automated attacks.\n * Permits default, weak, or well-known passwords, such as \"Password1\" or \"admin\/admin\".\n * Uses weak or ineffective credential recovery and forgot-password processes, such as \"knowledge-based answers,\" which cannot be made safe.\n * Uses plain text, encrypted, or weakly hashed passwords data stores (see A02:2021-Cryptographic Failures).\n * Has missing or ineffective multi-factor authentication.\n"],"24":["Identification and Authentication Failures: Previously known as Broken Authentication, this category slid down from the second position and now includes Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) related to identification failures. Notable CWEs included are CWE-297: Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch, CWE-287: Improper Authentication, and CWE-384: Session Fixation.\n Description\nConfirmation of the user's identity, authentication, and session management is critical to protect against authentication-related attacks. There may be authentication weaknesses if the application:\n* Permits automated attacks such as credential stuffing, where the attacker has a list of valid usernames and passwords.\n","Broken Access Control: Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data, and CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery.\n","Cryptographic Failures: Notable Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) included are CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded Password, CWE-327: Broken or Risky Crypto Algorithm, and CWE-331 Insufficient Entropy.\n Description\nThe first thing is to determine the protection needs of data in transit and at rest. For example, passwords, credit card numbers, health records, personal information, and business secrets require extra protection, mainly if that data falls under privacy laws, e.g., EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), or regulations, e.g., financial data protection such as PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS)."],"25":["Broken Access Control: If an unauthenticated user can access either page, it's a flaw. If a non-admin can access the admin page, this is a flaw.","Broken Access Control: https:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountInfo?acct=notmyacct\nScenario #2: An attacker simply forces browses to target URLs. Admin rights are required for access to the admin page.\n","Broken Access Control: Acting as a user without being logged in or acting as an admin when logged in as a user.\n * Metadata manipulation, such as replaying or tampering with a JSON Web Token (JWT) access control token, or a cookie or hidden field manipulated to elevate privileges or abusing JWT invalidation.\n * CORS misconfiguration allows API access from unauthorized\/untrusted origins.\n * Force browsing to authenticated pages as an unauthenticated user or to privileged pages as a standard user.\n How to Prevent\nAccess control is only effective in trusted server-side code or server-less API, where the attacker cannot modify the access control check or metadata.\n"],"26":["Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: Ensure all login, access control, and server-side input validation failures can be logged with sufficient user context to identify suspicious or malicious accounts and held for enough time to allow delayed forensic analysis.\n * Ensure that logs are generated in a format that log management solutions can easily consume.\n * Ensure log data is encoded correctly to prevent injections or attacks on the logging or monitoring systems.\n * Ensure high-value transactions have an audit trail with integrity controls to prevent tampering or deletion, such as append-only database tables or similar.\n * DevSecOps teams should establish effective monitoring and alerting such that suspicious activities are detected and responded to quickly.\n","Identification and Authentication Failures: Log all failures and alert administrators when credential stuffing, brute force, or other attacks are detected.\n * Use a server-side, secure, built-in session manager that generates a new random session ID with high entropy after login. Session identifier should not be in the URL, be securely stored, and invalidated after logout, idle, and absolute timeouts.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: Credential stuffing, the use of lists of known passwords, is a common attack. Suppose an application does not implement automated threat or credential stuffing protection.","Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: Without logging and monitoring, breaches cannot be detected. Insufficient logging, detection, monitoring, and active response occurs any time:\n* Auditable events, such as logins, failed logins, and high-value transactions, are not logged.\n * Warnings and errors generate no, inadequate, or unclear log messages.\n * Logs of applications and APIs are not monitored for suspicious activity.\n Logs are only stored locally.\n"],"27":["Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: Security logging and monitoring came from the Top 10 community survey (#3), up slightly from the tenth position in the OWASP Top 10 2017.","Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: Logging and monitoring can be challenging to test, often involving interviews or asking if attacks were detected during a penetration test. There isn't much CVE\/CVSS data for this category, but detecting and responding to breaches is critical. Still, it can be very impactful for accountability, visibility, incident alerting, and forensics. This category expands beyond CWE-778 Insufficient Logging to include CWE-117 Improper Output Neutralization for Logs, CWE-223 Omission of Security-relevant Information, and CWE-532Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File.\n Description\nReturning to the OWASP Top 10 2021, this category is to help detect, escalate, and respond to active breaches.","Software and Data Integrity Failures: [OWASP Cheat Sheet: Software Supply Chain Security](Coming Soon)\n* [OWASP Cheat Sheet: Secure build and deployment](Coming Soon)"],"28":["Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Such flaws can be accidental (e.g., coding error) or intentional (e.g., a backdoor in a component). Some example exploitable component vulnerabilities discovered are:\n* CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\n * While the internet of things (IoT) is frequently difficult or impossible to patch, the importance of patching them can be great (e.g., biomedical devices).\n There are automated tools to help attackers find unpatched or misconfigured systems. For example, the Shodan IoT search engine can help you find devices that still suffer from Heartbleed vulnerability patched in April 2014.","Identification and Authentication Failures: Log all failures and alert administrators when credential stuffing, brute force, or other attacks are detected.\n * Use a server-side, secure, built-in session manager that generates a new random session ID with high entropy after login. Session identifier should not be in the URL, be securely stored, and invalidated after logout, idle, and absolute timeouts.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: Credential stuffing, the use of lists of known passwords, is a common attack. Suppose an application does not implement automated threat or credential stuffing protection.","Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: * Establish or adopt an incident response and recovery plan, such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-61r2 or later.\n There are commercial and open-source application protection frameworks such as the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set, and open-source log correlation software, such as the Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana (ELK) stack, that feature custom dashboards and alerting.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: A children's health plan provider's website operator couldn't detect a breach due to a lack of monitoring and logging. An external party informed the health plan provider that an attacker had accessed and modified thousands of sensitive health records of more than 3.5 million children. A post-incident review found that the website developers had not addressed significant vulnerabilities."],"29":["Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Such flaws can be accidental (e.g., coding error) or intentional (e.g., a backdoor in a component). Some example exploitable component vulnerabilities discovered are:\n* CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\n * While the internet of things (IoT) is frequently difficult or impossible to patch, the importance of patching them can be great (e.g., biomedical devices).\n There are automated tools to help attackers find unpatched or misconfigured systems. For example, the Shodan IoT search engine can help you find devices that still suffer from Heartbleed vulnerability patched in April 2014.","Cryptographic Failures: An attacker monitors network traffic (e.g., at an insecure wireless network), downgrades connections from HTTPS to HTTP, intercepts requests, and steals the user's session cookie. The attacker then replays this cookie and hijacks the user's (authenticated) session, accessing or modifying the user's private data. Instead of the above they could alter all transported data, e.g., the recipient of a money transfer.\n Scenario #3: The password database uses unsalted or simple hashes to store everyone's passwords. A file upload flaw allows an attacker to retrieve the password database.","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed."],"30":["Insecure Design: Threat modeling should be integrated into refinement sessions (or similar activities); look for changes in data flows and access control or other security controls. In the user story development determine the correct flow and failure states, ensure they are well understood and agreed upon by responsible and impacted parties. Analyze assumptions and conditions for expected and failure flows, ensure they are still accurate and desirable. Determine how to validate the assumptions and enforce conditions needed for proper behaviors. Ensure the results are documented in the user story.","Broken Access Control: Developers and QA staff should include functional access control unit and integration tests.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: The application uses unverified data in a SQL call that is accessing account information:\npstmt.setString(1, request.getParameter(\"acct\"));\nResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );\nAn attacker simply modifies the browser's 'acct' parameter to send whatever account number they want. If not correctly verified, the attacker can access any user's account.\n","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed."],"31":["Vulnerable and Outdated Components: * Continuously inventory the versions of both client-side and server-side components (e.g., frameworks, libraries) and their dependencies using tools like versions, OWASP Dependency Check, retire.js, etc. Continuously monitor sources like Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) and National Vulnerability Database (NVD) for vulnerabilities in the components. Use software composition analysis tools to automate the process. Subscribe to email alerts for security vulnerabilities related to components you use.\n * Only obtain components from official sources over secure links.","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: If you do not know the versions of all components you use (both client-side and server-side). This includes components you directly use as well as nested dependencies.\n If the software is vulnerable, unsupported, or out of date. This includes the OS, web\/application server, database management system (DBMS), applications, APIs and all components, runtime environments, and libraries.\n * If you do not scan for vulnerabilities regularly and subscribe to security bulletins related to the components you use.\n","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Prefer signed packages to reduce the chance of including a modified, malicious component (See A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures).\n * Monitor for libraries and components that are unmaintained or do not create security patches for older versions. If patching is not possible, consider deploying a virtual patch to monitor, detect, or protect against the discovered issue.\n Every organization must ensure an ongoing plan for monitoring, triaging, and applying updates or configuration changes for the lifetime of the application or portfolio.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: Components typically run with the same privileges as the application itself, so flaws in any component can result in serious impact."],"32":["Broken Access Control: Description\nAccess control enforces policy such that users cannot act outside of their intended permissions. Failures typically lead to unauthorized information disclosure, modification, or destruction of all data or performing a business function outside the user's limits.","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed.","Broken Access Control: Moving up from the fifth position, 94% of applications were tested for some form of broken access control with the average incidence rate of 3.81%, and has the most occurrences in the contributed dataset with over 318k."],"33":["Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: Appropriate alerting thresholds and response escalation processes are not in place or effective.\n * Penetration testing and scans by dynamic application security testing (DAST) tools (such as OWASP ZAP) do not trigger alerts.\n The application cannot detect, escalate, or alert for active attacks in real-time or near real-time.\n You are vulnerable to information leakage by making logging and alerting events visible to a user or an attacker (see A01:2021-Broken Access Control).\n How to Prevent\nDevelopers should implement some or all the following controls, depending on the risk of the application:\n*","Security Logging and Monitoring Failures: * Establish or adopt an incident response and recovery plan, such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-61r2 or later.\n There are commercial and open-source application protection frameworks such as the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set, and open-source log correlation software, such as the Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana (ELK) stack, that feature custom dashboards and alerting.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: A children's health plan provider's website operator couldn't detect a breach due to a lack of monitoring and logging. An external party informed the health plan provider that an attacker had accessed and modified thousands of sensitive health records of more than 3.5 million children. A post-incident review found that the website developers had not addressed significant vulnerabilities.","Broken Access Control: Developers and QA staff should include functional access control unit and integration tests.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: The application uses unverified data in a SQL call that is accessing account information:\npstmt.setString(1, request.getParameter(\"acct\"));\nResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );\nAn attacker simply modifies the browser's 'acct' parameter to send whatever account number they want. If not correctly verified, the attacker can access any user's account.\n"],"34":["Broken Access Control: If an unauthenticated user can access either page, it's a flaw. If a non-admin can access the admin page, this is a flaw.","Broken Access Control: Acting as a user without being logged in or acting as an admin when logged in as a user.\n * Metadata manipulation, such as replaying or tampering with a JSON Web Token (JWT) access control token, or a cookie or hidden field manipulated to elevate privileges or abusing JWT invalidation.\n * CORS misconfiguration allows API access from unauthorized\/untrusted origins.\n * Force browsing to authenticated pages as an unauthenticated user or to privileged pages as a standard user.\n How to Prevent\nAccess control is only effective in trusted server-side code or server-less API, where the attacker cannot modify the access control check or metadata.\n","Broken Access Control: Violation of the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be granted for particular capabilities, roles, or users, but is available to anyone.\n * Bypassing access control checks by modifying the URL (parameter tampering or force browsing), internal application state, or the HTML page, or by using an attack tool modifying API requests.\n * Permitting viewing or editing someone else's account, by providing its unique identifier (insecure direct object references)\n * Accessing API with missing access controls for POST, PUT and DELETE.\n * Elevation of privilege."],"35":["Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF): This category is added from the Top 10 community survey (#1). The data shows a relatively low incidence rate with above average testing coverage and above-average Exploit and Impact potential ratings. As new entries are likely to be a single or small cluster of Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) for attention and awareness, the hope is that they are subject to focus and can be rolled into a larger category in a future edition.\n Description\nSSRF flaws occur whenever a web application is fetching a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. It allows an attacker to coerce the application to send a crafted request to an unexpected destination, even when protected by a firewall, VPN, or another type of network access control list (ACL).\n","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Such flaws can be accidental (e.g., coding error) or intentional (e.g., a backdoor in a component). Some example exploitable component vulnerabilities discovered are:\n* CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\n * While the internet of things (IoT) is frequently difficult or impossible to patch, the importance of patching them can be great (e.g., biomedical devices).\n There are automated tools to help attackers find unpatched or misconfigured systems. For example, the Shodan IoT search engine can help you find devices that still suffer from Heartbleed vulnerability patched in April 2014.","Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF): As modern web applications provide end-users with convenient features, fetching a URL becomes a common scenario. As a result, the incidence of SSRF is increasing. Also, the severity of SSRF is becoming higher due to cloud services and the complexity of architectures.\n How to Prevent\nDevelopers can prevent SSRF by implementing some or all the following defense in depth controls:\nFrom Network layer\n* Segment remote resource access functionality in separate networks to reduce the impact of SSRF\n* Enforce \u201cdeny by default\u201d firewall policies or network access control rules to block all but essential intranet traffic."],"36":["Broken Access Control: Description\nAccess control enforces policy such that users cannot act outside of their intended permissions. Failures typically lead to unauthorized information disclosure, modification, or destruction of all data or performing a business function outside the user's limits.","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed.","Broken Access Control: Developers and QA staff should include functional access control unit and integration tests.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: The application uses unverified data in a SQL call that is accessing account information:\npstmt.setString(1, request.getParameter(\"acct\"));\nResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );\nAn attacker simply modifies the browser's 'acct' parameter to send whatever account number they want. If not correctly verified, the attacker can access any user's account.\n"],"37":["Software and Data Integrity Failures: * Ensure libraries and dependencies, such as npm or Maven, are consuming trusted repositories. If you have a higher risk profile, consider hosting an internal known-good repository that's vetted.\n * Ensure that a software supply chain security tool, such as OWASP Dependency Check or OWASP CycloneDX, is used to verify that components do not contain known vulnerabilities\n* Ensure that there is a review process for code and configuration changes to minimize the chance that malicious code or configuration could be introduced into your software pipeline.\n * Ensure that your CI\/CD pipeline has proper segregation, configuration, and access control to ensure the integrity of the code flowing through the build and deploy processes.\n","Insecure Design: Learn from mistakes and offer positive incentives to promote improvements. Secure design is neither an add-on nor a tool that you can add to software.\n Secure Development Lifecycle\nSecure software requires a secure development lifecycle, some form of secure design pattern, paved road methodology, secured component library, tooling, and threat modeling. Reach out for your security specialists at the beginning of a software project throughout the whole project and maintenance of your software. Consider leveraging the OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to help structure your secure software development efforts.\n","Software and Data Integrity Failures: [OWASP Cheat Sheet: Software Supply Chain Security](Coming Soon)\n* [OWASP Cheat Sheet: Secure build and deployment](Coming Soon)"],"38":["Injection: Hostile data is directly used or concatenated. The SQL or command contains the structure and malicious data in dynamic queries, commands, or stored procedures.\n Some of the more common injections are SQL, NoSQL, OS command, Object Relational Mapping (ORM), LDAP, and Expression Language (EL) or Object Graph Navigation Library (OGNL) injection. The concept is identical among all interpreters. Source code review is the best method of detecting if applications are vulnerable to injections.","Injection: Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: An application uses untrusted data in the construction of the following vulnerable SQL call:\nString query = \"SELECT \\* FROM accounts WHERE custID='\" + request.getParameter(\"id\") + \"'\";\nScenario #2: Similarly, an application\u2019s blind trust in frameworks may result in queries that are still vulnerable, (e.g., Hibernate Query Language (HQL)):\nQuery HQLQuery = session.createQuery(\"FROM accounts WHERE custID='\" + request.getParameter(\"id\") + \"'\");\nIn both cases, the attacker modifies the \u2018id\u2019 parameter value in their browser to send: ' UNION SLEEP(10);--. For example:\nhttp:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountView?id=' UNION SELECT SLEEP(10);--\n","Broken Access Control: Developers and QA staff should include functional access control unit and integration tests.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: The application uses unverified data in a SQL call that is accessing account information:\npstmt.setString(1, request.getParameter(\"acct\"));\nResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( );\nAn attacker simply modifies the browser's 'acct' parameter to send whatever account number they want. If not correctly verified, the attacker can access any user's account.\n"],"39":["Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed.","Security Misconfiguration: * Default accounts and their passwords are still enabled and unchanged.\n * Error handling reveals stack traces or other overly informative error messages to users.\n * For upgraded systems, the latest security features are disabled or not configured securely.\n The security settings in the application servers, application frameworks (e.g., Struts, Spring, ASP.NET), libraries, databases, etc., are not set to secure values.\n The server does not send security headers or directives, or they are not set to secure values.\n","Software and Data Integrity Failures: * Ensure that unsigned or unencrypted serialized data is not sent to untrusted clients without some form of integrity check or digital signature to detect tampering or replay of the serialized data\nExample Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1 Update without signing: Many home routers, set-top boxes, device firmware, and others do not verify updates via signed firmware. Unsigned firmware is a growing target for attackers and is expected to only get worse. This is a major concern as many times there is no mechanism to remediate other than to fix in a future version and wait for previous versions to age out.\n Scenario #2 SolarWinds malicious update: Nation-states have been known to attack update mechanisms, with a recent notable attack being the SolarWinds Orion attack. The company that develops the software had secure build and update integrity processes."],"40":["Cryptographic Failures: * Store passwords using strong adaptive and salted hashing functions with a work factor (delay factor), such as Argon2, scrypt, bcrypt or PBKDF2.\n * Initialization vectors must be chosen appropriate for the mode of operation. For many modes, this means using a CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator). For modes that require a nonce, then the initialization vector (IV) does not need a CSPRNG. In all cases, the IV should never be used twice for a fixed key.\n","Cryptographic Failures: Is an insecure mode of operation such as ECB in use? Is encryption used when authenticated encryption is more appropriate?\n* Are passwords being used as cryptographic keys in absence of a password base key derivation function?\n * Is randomness used for cryptographic purposes that was not designed to meet cryptographic requirements? Even if the correct function is chosen, does it need to be seeded by the developer, and if not, has the developer over-written the strong seeding functionality built into it with a seed that lacks sufficient entropy\/unpredictability?\n","Cryptographic Failures: * Are deprecated hash functions such as MD5 or SHA1 in use, or are non-cryptographic hash functions used when cryptographic hash functions are needed?\n * Are deprecated cryptographic padding methods such as PKCS number 1 v1.5 in use?\n * Are cryptographic error messages or side channel information exploitable, for example in the form of padding oracle attacks?\n See ASVS Crypto (V7), Data Protection (V9), and SSL\/TLS (V10)\nHow to Prevent\nDo the following, at a minimum, and consult the references:\n* Classify data processed, stored, or transmitted by an application. Identify which data is sensitive according to privacy laws, regulatory requirements, or business needs.\n"],"41":["Broken Access Control: Acting as a user without being logged in or acting as an admin when logged in as a user.\n * Metadata manipulation, such as replaying or tampering with a JSON Web Token (JWT) access control token, or a cookie or hidden field manipulated to elevate privileges or abusing JWT invalidation.\n * CORS misconfiguration allows API access from unauthorized\/untrusted origins.\n * Force browsing to authenticated pages as an unauthenticated user or to privileged pages as a standard user.\n How to Prevent\nAccess control is only effective in trusted server-side code or server-less API, where the attacker cannot modify the access control check or metadata.\n","Broken Access Control: https:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountInfo?acct=notmyacct\nScenario #2: An attacker simply forces browses to target URLs. Admin rights are required for access to the admin page.\n","Broken Access Control: Violation of the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be granted for particular capabilities, roles, or users, but is available to anyone.\n * Bypassing access control checks by modifying the URL (parameter tampering or force browsing), internal application state, or the HTML page, or by using an attack tool modifying API requests.\n * Permitting viewing or editing someone else's account, by providing its unique identifier (insecure direct object references)\n * Accessing API with missing access controls for POST, PUT and DELETE.\n * Elevation of privilege."],"42":["Identification and Authentication Failures: * Exposes session identifier in the URL.\n * Reuse session identifier after successful login.\n * Does not correctly invalidate Session IDs. User sessions or authentication tokens (mainly single sign-on (SSO) tokens) aren't properly invalidated during logout or a period of inactivity.\n How to Prevent\n* Where possible, implement multi-factor authentication to prevent automated credential stuffing, brute force, and stolen credential reuse attacks.\n","Identification and Authentication Failures: Log all failures and alert administrators when credential stuffing, brute force, or other attacks are detected.\n * Use a server-side, secure, built-in session manager that generates a new random session ID with high entropy after login. Session identifier should not be in the URL, be securely stored, and invalidated after logout, idle, and absolute timeouts.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: Credential stuffing, the use of lists of known passwords, is a common attack. Suppose an application does not implement automated threat or credential stuffing protection.","Broken Access Control: * Log access control failures, alert admins when appropriate (e.g., repeated failures).\n Rate limit API and controller access to minimize the harm from automated attack tooling.\n * Stateful session identifiers should be invalidated on the server after logout. Stateless JWT tokens should rather be short-lived so that the window of opportunity for an attacker is minimized. For longer lived JWTs it's highly recommended to follow the OAuth standards to revoke access.\n"],"43":["Cryptographic Failures: * Store passwords using strong adaptive and salted hashing functions with a work factor (delay factor), such as Argon2, scrypt, bcrypt or PBKDF2.\n * Initialization vectors must be chosen appropriate for the mode of operation. For many modes, this means using a CSPRNG (cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator). For modes that require a nonce, then the initialization vector (IV) does not need a CSPRNG. In all cases, the IV should never be used twice for a fixed key.\n","Cryptographic Failures: * Always use authenticated encryption instead of just encryption.\n Keys should be generated cryptographically randomly and stored in memory as byte arrays. If a password is used, then it must be converted to a key via an appropriate password base key derivation function.\n * Ensure that cryptographic randomness is used where appropriate, and that it has not been seeded in a predictable way or with low entropy. Most modern APIs do not require the developer to seed the CSPRNG to get security.\n","Cryptographic Failures: * Are deprecated hash functions such as MD5 or SHA1 in use, or are non-cryptographic hash functions used when cryptographic hash functions are needed?\n * Are deprecated cryptographic padding methods such as PKCS number 1 v1.5 in use?\n * Are cryptographic error messages or side channel information exploitable, for example in the form of padding oracle attacks?\n See ASVS Crypto (V7), Data Protection (V9), and SSL\/TLS (V10)\nHow to Prevent\nDo the following, at a minimum, and consult the references:\n* Classify data processed, stored, or transmitted by an application. Identify which data is sensitive according to privacy laws, regulatory requirements, or business needs.\n"],"44":["Vulnerable and Outdated Components: * Continuously inventory the versions of both client-side and server-side components (e.g., frameworks, libraries) and their dependencies using tools like versions, OWASP Dependency Check, retire.js, etc. Continuously monitor sources like Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) and National Vulnerability Database (NVD) for vulnerabilities in the components. Use software composition analysis tools to automate the process. Subscribe to email alerts for security vulnerabilities related to components you use.\n * Only obtain components from official sources over secure links.","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: If you do not know the versions of all components you use (both client-side and server-side). This includes components you directly use as well as nested dependencies.\n If the software is vulnerable, unsupported, or out of date. This includes the OS, web\/application server, database management system (DBMS), applications, APIs and all components, runtime environments, and libraries.\n * If you do not scan for vulnerabilities regularly and subscribe to security bulletins related to the components you use.\n","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Prefer signed packages to reduce the chance of including a modified, malicious component (See A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures).\n * Monitor for libraries and components that are unmaintained or do not create security patches for older versions. If patching is not possible, consider deploying a virtual patch to monitor, detect, or protect against the discovered issue.\n Every organization must ensure an ongoing plan for monitoring, triaging, and applying updates or configuration changes for the lifetime of the application or portfolio.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: Components typically run with the same privileges as the application itself, so flaws in any component can result in serious impact."],"45":["Cryptographic Failures: * Are deprecated hash functions such as MD5 or SHA1 in use, or are non-cryptographic hash functions used when cryptographic hash functions are needed?\n * Are deprecated cryptographic padding methods such as PKCS number 1 v1.5 in use?\n * Are cryptographic error messages or side channel information exploitable, for example in the form of padding oracle attacks?\n See ASVS Crypto (V7), Data Protection (V9), and SSL\/TLS (V10)\nHow to Prevent\nDo the following, at a minimum, and consult the references:\n* Classify data processed, stored, or transmitted by an application. Identify which data is sensitive according to privacy laws, regulatory requirements, or business needs.\n","Cryptographic Failures: * Avoid deprecated cryptographic functions and padding schemes, such as MD5, SHA1, PKCS number 1 v1.5 .\n * Verify independently the effectiveness of configuration and settings.\n Example Attack Scenarios\nScenario #1: An application encrypts credit card numbers in a database using automatic database encryption. However, this data is automatically decrypted when retrieved, allowing a SQL injection flaw to retrieve credit card numbers in clear text.\n Scenario #2: A site doesn't use or enforce TLS for all pages or supports weak encryption.","Cryptographic Failures: Is an insecure mode of operation such as ECB in use? Is encryption used when authenticated encryption is more appropriate?\n* Are passwords being used as cryptographic keys in absence of a password base key derivation function?\n * Is randomness used for cryptographic purposes that was not designed to meet cryptographic requirements? Even if the correct function is chosen, does it need to be seeded by the developer, and if not, has the developer over-written the strong seeding functionality built into it with a seed that lacks sufficient entropy\/unpredictability?\n"],"46":["Broken Access Control: If an unauthenticated user can access either page, it's a flaw. If a non-admin can access the admin page, this is a flaw.","Broken Access Control: Violation of the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be granted for particular capabilities, roles, or users, but is available to anyone.\n * Bypassing access control checks by modifying the URL (parameter tampering or force browsing), internal application state, or the HTML page, or by using an attack tool modifying API requests.\n * Permitting viewing or editing someone else's account, by providing its unique identifier (insecure direct object references)\n * Accessing API with missing access controls for POST, PUT and DELETE.\n * Elevation of privilege.","Broken Access Control: Acting as a user without being logged in or acting as an admin when logged in as a user.\n * Metadata manipulation, such as replaying or tampering with a JSON Web Token (JWT) access control token, or a cookie or hidden field manipulated to elevate privileges or abusing JWT invalidation.\n * CORS misconfiguration allows API access from unauthorized\/untrusted origins.\n * Force browsing to authenticated pages as an unauthenticated user or to privileged pages as a standard user.\n How to Prevent\nAccess control is only effective in trusted server-side code or server-less API, where the attacker cannot modify the access control check or metadata.\n"],"47":["Insecure Design: Learn from mistakes and offer positive incentives to promote improvements. Secure design is neither an add-on nor a tool that you can add to software.\n Secure Development Lifecycle\nSecure software requires a secure development lifecycle, some form of secure design pattern, paved road methodology, secured component library, tooling, and threat modeling. Reach out for your security specialists at the beginning of a software project throughout the whole project and maintenance of your software. Consider leveraging the OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to help structure your secure software development efforts.\n","Insecure Design: How to Prevent\n* Establish and use a secure development lifecycle with AppSec professionals to help evaluate and design security and privacy-related controls\n* Establish and use a library of secure design patterns or paved road ready to use components\n* Use threat modeling for critical authentication, access control, business logic, and key flows\n* Integrate security language and controls into user stories\n* Integrate plausibility checks at each tier of your application (from frontend to backend)\n* Write unit and integration tests to validate that all critical flows are resistant to the threat model. Compile use-cases and misuse-cases for each tier of your application.\n * Segregate tier layers on the system and network layers depending on the exposure and protection needs\n* Segregate tenants robustly by design throughout all tiers\n*","Insecure Design: Requirements and Resource Management\nCollect and negotiate the business requirements for an application with the business, including the protection requirements concerning confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authenticity of all data assets and the expected business logic. Take into account how exposed your application will be and if you need segregation of tenants (additionally to access control). Compile the technical requirements, including functional and non-functional security requirements. Plan and negotiate the budget covering all design, build, testing, and operation, including security activities.\n Secure Design\nSecure design is a culture and methodology that constantly evaluates threats and ensures that code is robustly designed and tested to prevent known attack methods."],"48":["Broken Access Control: https:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountInfo?acct=notmyacct\nScenario #2: An attacker simply forces browses to target URLs. Admin rights are required for access to the admin page.\n","Broken Access Control: Acting as a user without being logged in or acting as an admin when logged in as a user.\n * Metadata manipulation, such as replaying or tampering with a JSON Web Token (JWT) access control token, or a cookie or hidden field manipulated to elevate privileges or abusing JWT invalidation.\n * CORS misconfiguration allows API access from unauthorized\/untrusted origins.\n * Force browsing to authenticated pages as an unauthenticated user or to privileged pages as a standard user.\n How to Prevent\nAccess control is only effective in trusted server-side code or server-less API, where the attacker cannot modify the access control check or metadata.\n","Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed."],"49":["Security Misconfiguration: The attacker then finds a severe access control flaw in the application.\n Scenario #3: The application server's configuration allows detailed error messages, e.g., stack traces, to be returned to users. This potentially exposes sensitive information or underlying flaws such as component versions that are known to be vulnerable.\n Scenario #4: A cloud service provider (CSP) has default sharing permissions open to the Internet by other CSP users. This allows sensitive data stored within cloud storage to be accessed.","Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Additional Measures to consider:\n* Don't deploy other security relevant services on front systems (e.g. OpenID). Control local traffic on these systems (e.g. localhost)\n For frontends with dedicated and manageable user groups use network encryption (e.g. VPNs) on independent systems to consider very high protection needs\nExample Attack Scenarios\nAttackers can use SSRF to attack systems protected behind web application firewalls, firewalls, or network ACLs, using scenarios such as:\nScenario #1: Port scan internal servers \u2013 If the network architecture is unsegmented, attackers can map out internal networks and determine if ports are open or closed on internal servers from connection results or elapsed time to connect or reject SSRF payload connections.\n Scenario #2: Sensitive data exposure \u2013 Attackers can access local files or internal services to gain sensitive information such as file:\/\/\/etc\/passwd and http:\/\/localhost:28017\/.\nScenario #3: Access metadata storage of cloud services \u2013 Most cloud providers have metadata storage such as http:\/\/169.254.169.254\/. An attacker can read the metadata to gain sensitive information.\n Scenario #4: Compromise internal services \u2013 The attacker can abuse internal services to conduct further attacks such as Remote Code Execution (RCE) or Denial of Service (DoS).","Vulnerable and Outdated Components: Such flaws can be accidental (e.g., coding error) or intentional (e.g., a backdoor in a component). Some example exploitable component vulnerabilities discovered are:\n* CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\n * While the internet of things (IoT) is frequently difficult or impossible to patch, the importance of patching them can be great (e.g., biomedical devices).\n There are automated tools to help attackers find unpatched or misconfigured systems. For example, the Shodan IoT search engine can help you find devices that still suffer from Heartbleed vulnerability patched in April 2014."]},"question":{"0":"What are the potential consequences of access control failures during a penetration test?","1":"What vulnerabilities in the third-party cloud hosting provider allowed the airline's data to be exposed for over ten years?","2":"If security settings for application servers, frameworks, libraries, and databases are not set to secure values, what vulnerabilities could a penetration tester exploit?","3":"What are the security logging and monitoring practices recommended by the OWASP Top 10 community survey, and how do they compare to the recommendations from the 2017 survey?","4":"While escaping special characters helps mitigate SQL injection vulnerabilities, why are user-supplied table and column names considered dangerous, and what kind of software is particularly vulnerable to this issue?","5":"How can an attacker exploit the use of unverified data in a SQL query that accesses account information to gain unauthorized access to user accounts?","6":"What are the key steps involved in establishing a secure development lifecycle to prevent vulnerabilities during application development?","7":"What are some common types of injection attacks that target dynamic queries and commands, and how is source code review helpful in identifying vulnerabilities to these attacks?","8":"What type of malicious action could a more dangerous attack perform beyond simply retrieving data from the accounts table?","9":"If an application server configuration exposes detailed error messages to users, what sensitive information could potentially be leaked, and what vulnerabilities might be exposed?","10":"If a penetration tester discovered that the security settings in the application servers and databases were not set to secure values, what vulnerabilities might they exploit?","11":"What is the potential risk of relying solely on password complexity and rotation as security measures for authentication?","12":"What security measures should be implemented to protect sensitive data, such as passwords and financial information, when it is transmitted or stored? ","13":"If a penetration test or DAST scan does not trigger alerts, how does the application ensure it can detect and respond to real-time attacks?","14":"What are the common vulnerabilities that can arise when user-supplied data is not properly validated or sanitized in an application, and how can these vulnerabilities be mitigated?","15":"What specific weaknesses in cryptography or its absence contribute to the exposure of sensitive data, making it a significant security concern?","16":"How can integrating security specialists early in the software development lifecycle contribute to building more secure applications?","17":"How can penetration testers assess the effectiveness of access control mechanisms implemented across the application, considering the goal of minimizing CORS usage and enforcing record ownership?","18":"If the application uses Java serialization to handle user state, could an attacker exploit this mechanism to achieve remote code execution by utilizing tools like Java Serial Killer?","19":"What are the key differences between an insecure design and an insecure implementation in the context of cybersecurity and penetration testing?","20":"How can rate limiting API and controller access help mitigate the impact of automated attacks?","21":"What are the security risks associated with not changing default accounts in an admin console, and how can an attacker exploit this vulnerability?","22":"How can threat modeling be used during refinement sessions to identify potential security risks associated with changes in data flows and access controls within a user story?","23":"What are the security implications of using hard-coded passwords, weak cryptographic algorithms, and insufficient entropy in data protection, particularly when sensitive data like financial information or personal records are involved?","24":"What are some examples of Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) that fall under the 'Broken Authentication' category, and how do they relate to identification failures?","25":"What are the potential vulnerabilities if an unauthenticated user can access an administrative page intended only for authorized personnel?","26":"How can login failures, access control breaches, and server-side input validation errors be logged effectively with sufficient user context to detect malicious activity, and how can this log data be formatted for easy consumption by security monitoring tools?","27":"Why did security logging and monitoring move up in the OWASP Top 10 rankings from 2017 to 2023?","28":"What are some automated tools that attackers can use to identify systems with unpatched vulnerabilities, like the Heartbleed vulnerability, and what are some examples of vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit?","29":"What is a common vulnerability that enables attackers to execute arbitrary code on a server, and what is an example of a high-profile breach that was attributed to this type of vulnerability?","30":"During user story development, how can penetration testing be integrated to identify potential vulnerabilities related to data flow changes and access control mechanisms?","31":"What tools can be used to continuously inventory the versions of both client-side and server-side components, and how can these tools be used to monitor for vulnerabilities in these components?","32":"What are some common consequences of access control failures during a penetration test?","33":"If penetration testing and DAST tools like OWASP ZAP don't trigger alerts, how can the application be improved to detect and respond to active attacks in real-time or near real-time?","34":"What are the potential vulnerabilities if an unauthenticated user can access pages that are intended for authenticated users only?","35":"If a web application fetches a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL, what type of vulnerability could this indicate, and what potential impact could it have?","36":"What are the potential consequences if access control mechanisms fail during a penetration test?","37":"What are some of the key security considerations to address when building and deploying software within a secure software supply chain?","38":"How can attackers exploit vulnerabilities like SQL injection to directly manipulate data or commands within a database?","39":"What specific security risk is associated with returning detailed error messages, including stack traces, to users in a web application?","40":"When using adaptive and salted hashing functions for password storage, what is the purpose of the work factor or delay factor?","41":"How can an attacker bypass access control checks in a web application and gain unauthorized access, such as viewing or editing someone else's account?","42":"What are the security risks associated with a web application that exposes session identifiers in the URL and does not properly invalidate session IDs during logout?","43":"What are the recommended hashing functions for storing passwords, and what factors should be considered when choosing them?","44":"What tools and resources are recommended for continuously tracking the versions of client-side and server-side components, as well as monitoring for vulnerabilities in those components?","45":"Are deprecated cryptographic padding methods like PKCS number 1 v1.5 being utilized in the application, potentially creating vulnerabilities for padding oracle attacks?","46":"What kind of security vulnerability is present if an unauthenticated user can access a page that should only be accessible to authenticated users?","47":"What are the key elements of a secure development lifecycle (SDL) and why is it important to involve security specialists from the beginning of a software project?","48":"If an attacker could force a user to browse to a specific URL, such as \"https:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountInfo?acct=notmyacct\", could they access sensitive account information without proper authorization?","49":"What type of vulnerability is demonstrated in the provided attack scenarios and how can an attacker exploit it to delay or disrupt the application's operation?"},"answer":{"0":"In the context of a penetration test where access control failures are exploited, the potential consequences can be severe:\n\n* **Data Breach:** Attackers can gain unauthorized access to sensitive information like customer data, financial records, or proprietary intellectual property. This can lead to reputational damage, legal repercussions, and financial losses for the organization.\n* **System Compromise:** Access control failures can allow attackers to escalate privileges and gain full control over systems and applications. This can be used to install malware, disrupt operations, or launch further attacks against other targets.\n* **Business Disruption:** Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities to disable critical systems, services, or applications, causing significant disruption to business operations and potentially leading to financial losses.\n* **Financial Loss:** Data breaches can lead to direct financial losses from stolen funds, ransomware payments, or recovery efforts. Additionally, organizations may face legal penalties, regulatory fines, and loss of customer trust.\n\n\nThe scenarios provided in the context highlight specific examples:\n\n* **Scenario #3:** Detailed error messages revealing sensitive information or vulnerabilities can help attackers plan further attacks or exploit existing weaknesses.\n* **Scenario #4:** Default sharing permissions open to the internet allow attackers to directly access sensitive data stored in cloud storage without any authentication or authorization.\n\n\nAddressing these vulnerabilities through robust access control measures, secure configurations, and thorough testing is crucial to mitigate these risks during penetration tests and real-world attacks. \n","1":"Based on the provided context, here's what we can infer about the vulnerabilities:\n\n* **Security Logging and Monitoring Failures:** The most significant vulnerability seems to be the lack of logging and monitoring at the third-party cloud hosting provider. This allowed the breach to persist undetected for over ten years. \n\nWhile other scenarios mention potential vulnerabilities like misconfigurations and default sharing permissions, they don't directly apply to the airline's case as described. The context heavily emphasizes the extended period of the breach due to the absence of security monitoring.\n\n\nLet me know if you have any more questions or need further clarification! \n","2":"Based on the context provided, if security settings for application servers, frameworks, libraries, and databases are not set to secure values, a penetration tester could exploit various vulnerabilities:\n\n* **Default Configurations:** Many systems come with default configurations that are overly permissive. A penetration tester could exploit these by:\n * **Gaining Unauthorized Access:** Weak passwords, open ports, or unauthenticated access points could allow the tester to gain initial access to the system.\n * **Privilege Escalation:** Insufficient permission controls could allow an attacker to elevate their privileges and gain control over more sensitive resources.\n\n* **Insecure Error Handling:** Detailed error messages revealing stack traces, component versions, or internal system information could be exploited to:\n * **Identify Vulnerable Components:** The tester could learn about specific software versions known to have vulnerabilities.\n * **Understand System Architecture:** Error messages might expose the structure of the application and its dependencies, aiding in further exploitation attempts.\n\n* **Misconfigured Security Features:** Improperly configured firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), or security information and event management (SIEM) systems could allow the tester to:\n * **Bypass Security Measures:** The tester might find loopholes or misconfigurations that disable or weaken existing security controls.\n * **Remain Undetected:** A poorly configured IDS might fail to detect malicious activity, allowing the attacker to operate undetected for longer periods.\n\n* **Unpatched Vulnerabilities:** Outdated software components are prime targets for exploitation. A penetration tester could use known vulnerabilities in:\n * **Application Servers and Frameworks:** Exploit remote code execution (RCE) flaws to take control of the server or inject malicious code.\n * **Libraries and Databases:** Gain access to sensitive data, modify application behavior, or disrupt service availability.\n\n\n\nBy exploiting these misconfigurations and vulnerabilities, a penetration tester could gain unauthorized access, steal data, disrupt services, or even take complete control of the system. \n","3":"The context provided highlights key security logging and monitoring practices recommended by the OWASP Top 10 community, but it doesn't directly compare them to the 2017 survey recommendations. \n\nHere's what we can glean from the text:\n\n**Current Recommendations (OWASP Top 10 2021):**\n\n* **Establish an Incident Response and Recovery Plan:** This emphasizes the importance of having a structured plan in place, referencing NIST 800-61r2 or later as a potential framework.\n* **Utilize Security Tools:** The text mentions commercial and open-source solutions like OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set for application protection and ELK stack for log correlation, dashboards, and alerting.\n\n**Implicit Comparisons:**\n\n* **Increased Importance:** The fact that \"Security Logging and Monitoring\" moved up from the tenth position in 2017 to the third position in 2021 suggests a growing recognition of its criticality within the cybersecurity community.\n* **Broadened Scope:** The 2021 category encompasses more than just insufficient logging (CWE-778). It now includes improper output neutralization for logs, omission of security-relevant information, and insertion of sensitive data into log files. This indicates a shift towards a more comprehensive understanding of logging and monitoring best practices.\n\n**To get a direct comparison:** You would need to consult the OWASP Top 10 reports from both 2017 and 2021. \n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions about cybersecurity best practices! \n","4":"The context states that **user-supplied table and column names cannot be escaped**, making them dangerous because an attacker could use this to:\n\n* **Access unauthorized data:** By specifying malicious table and column names, an attacker might gain access to sensitive information they wouldn't normally be allowed to see. \n* **Manipulate existing data:** An attacker could potentially insert, update, or delete data in unintended tables or columns.\n* **Bypass security measures:** Escaping character-based vulnerabilities doesn't protect against manipulation of the query structure itself.\n\n**Software particularly vulnerable to this issue includes:**\n\n* **Report-writing software:** This type of software often allows users to dynamically specify the data they want to include in reports, making it susceptible to attacks targeting table and column names.\n* **Database management systems (DBMS) with user-defined queries:** Any DBMS that allows users to construct their own SQL queries without proper input validation is at risk.\n\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions! \n","5":"In Scenario #1 provided, an attacker can exploit the unverified use of `request.getParameter(\"acct\")` in the SQL query by directly manipulating the \"acct\" parameter in their browser request. \n\nHere's how:\n\n1. **Parameter Manipulation:** The attacker modifies the URL to include a different account number than what they are actually authorized to view. For example, if they want to access account #1234, they would change the URL to something like `http:\/\/example.com\/app\/?acct=1234`.\n\n2. **SQL Query Execution:** The application blindly trusts this manipulated \"acct\" parameter and inserts it directly into the SQL query:\n `pstmt.setString(1, request.getParameter(\"acct\"));` \n This results in a query like `SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE acct='1234'`.\n\n3. **Unauthorized Access:** Since the attacker has provided a fabricated account number, the database will return all information associated with that account, granting them unauthorized access to sensitive user data.\n\n\n**To prevent this attack, the application must:**\n\n* **Sanitize and Validate Input:** Never trust user-supplied data. Implement robust input validation and sanitization techniques to ensure that the \"acct\" parameter only contains valid account numbers within a defined range.\n\n* **Use Prepared Statements:** Employ parameterized queries (prepared statements) to separate data from SQL commands. This prevents attackers from injecting malicious code into the query structure.\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions. \n","6":"Based on the provided context, here are the key steps involved in establishing a secure development lifecycle to prevent vulnerabilities during application development:\n\n1. **Involve Security Professionals Early and Throughout:** Integrate security specialists from the beginning of the project and maintain their involvement throughout development, testing, deployment, and maintenance. \n\n2. **Establish a Secure Development Lifecycle (SDLC):** Implement a formalized SDLC that incorporates security best practices at every stage. Leverage frameworks like the OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) to guide your efforts.\n\n3. **Secure Design Patterns and Components:**\n * Utilize a library of pre-vetted secure design patterns and components. \n * Encourage developers to adopt these proven solutions rather than reinventing the wheel.\n\n4. **Threat Modeling:** Conduct thorough threat modeling exercises for critical aspects of the application, including authentication, access control, business logic, and key data flows. Identify potential vulnerabilities and develop mitigation strategies.\n\n5. **Integrate Security into Requirements:** Embed security considerations directly into user stories and functional requirements. This ensures that security is not an afterthought but a fundamental part of the design process.\n\n6. **Plausibility Checks:** Implement plausibility checks at each tier of the application (frontend, backend, database) to validate data integrity and prevent common injection attacks.\n\n7. **Testing for Security:**\n * Write comprehensive unit and integration tests that specifically target vulnerabilities identified in the threat modeling phase. \n * Develop use-cases and misuse-cases for each tier to ensure all potential attack vectors are covered.\n\n8. **Tier Segregation:** Separate application tiers (frontend, backend, database) both physically and logically based on their sensitivity and required security levels. This limits the impact of a breach if one tier is compromised.\n\n9. **Tenant Isolation:** Robustly isolate tenants throughout all application tiers to prevent data leakage and unauthorized access between different user groups or organizations.\n\n10. **Secure Configuration Processes:** Establish repeatable hardening processes for development, QA, and production environments. Ensure consistent configurations across all stages to minimize vulnerabilities due to misconfiguration.\n\n\n\nRemember, a secure development lifecycle is an ongoing process that requires continuous improvement, collaboration, and vigilance. \n","7":"Here's a breakdown of common injection attacks targeting dynamic queries and commands, along with how source code review helps identify vulnerabilities:\n\n**Common Injection Attacks:**\n\n* **SQL Injection (SQLi):** Attackers insert malicious SQL code into data inputs, manipulating database queries to steal, modify, or delete sensitive information.\n* **NoSQL Injection:** Similar to SQLi but targets NoSQL databases like MongoDB, Couchbase, etc., exploiting vulnerabilities in their query languages.\n* **OS Command Injection (OCI):** Attackers inject commands that are executed by the operating system directly through vulnerable applications. This can lead to complete system compromise.\n* **Object-Relational Mapping (ORM) Injection:** Exploits weaknesses in ORMs like Hibernate or Django ORM, manipulating queries behind the scenes to gain unauthorized access to data.\n* **LDAP Injection:** Targets Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) servers by injecting malicious code into search queries, potentially retrieving confidential user information or even controlling the server itself.\n* **Expression Language (EL) \/ OGNL Injection:** Exploits vulnerabilities in web frameworks that use EL or OGNL for dynamic content generation, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code or access sensitive data.\n\n**How Source Code Review Helps:**\n\nSource code review is crucial for identifying injection vulnerabilities because it allows security professionals to:\n\n1. **Analyze Input Handling:** Examine how user-supplied data is received, processed, and used within queries or commands. Look for instances where input is directly concatenated without proper sanitization or escaping.\n2. **Identify Dynamic Query Construction:** Review code that builds SQL or other query strings dynamically based on user input. Pay close attention to functions that construct these queries, ensuring they use parameterized queries or safe APIs to prevent injection.\n3. **Scrutinize Command Execution:** Carefully analyze any code that executes external commands based on user input. Ensure proper validation and sanitization are applied to prevent malicious commands from being executed.\n4. **Evaluate ORM Usage:** Review how ORMs are used within the application, ensuring they are configured securely and that input parameters are properly escaped.\n\n**Remember:** While automated tools can assist in detecting potential injection vulnerabilities, source code review remains the most effective method for comprehensively identifying and mitigating these risks.\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions!","8":"Beyond simply retrieving data from the \"accounts\" table, a more dangerous attack could **modify or delete data**, or even **invoke stored procedures** within the database. \n\n\nThis information is directly stated in the provided context under the \"Injection\" heading. \n","9":"In this scenario, exposing detailed error messages to users could leak:\n\n**Sensitive Information:**\n\n* **Stack Traces:** These reveal the internal workings of the application, potentially exposing sensitive code logic, database queries, and function calls. An attacker could use this information to understand how the application functions and identify vulnerabilities.\n* **Database Error Messages:** These might contain snippets of SQL queries or database schema details, giving attackers insights into the structure and contents of your database.\n* **File Paths:** Error messages could reveal file paths within the server, potentially exposing sensitive configuration files, log files containing user data, or even source code repositories.\n* **Component Versions:** Outdated or vulnerable component versions mentioned in error messages can be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access or execute malicious code.\n\n**Exposed Vulnerabilities:**\n\n* **Code Injection:** An attacker could exploit the detailed error information to craft specific input that triggers vulnerabilities like SQL injection, command injection, or cross-site scripting (XSS).\n* **Reverse Engineering:** Analyzing the exposed error messages and stack traces can help attackers reverse engineer the application's functionality, identifying weaknesses and potential attack vectors.\n* **Credential Exposure:** In rare cases, sensitive information like usernames or partially hashed passwords might be inadvertently revealed in error messages.\n\n**Mitigation:**\n\n\nTo prevent these risks, it is crucial to:\n\n* **Disable Detailed Error Messages for Public Users:** Configure the application server to return generic error messages that do not reveal sensitive information.\n* **Log Errors Properly:** Capture detailed error logs internally for debugging purposes but ensure they are securely stored and inaccessible to unauthorized users.\n* **Implement Input Validation:** Sanitize all user input thoroughly to prevent code injection attacks.\n* **Keep Components Updated:** Regularly patch and update all software components to mitigate known vulnerabilities.\n\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions about cybersecurity best practices!","10":"Based on the context provided, here are some vulnerabilities a penetration tester might exploit if application servers and databases have insecure settings: \n\n* **SQL Injection:** The provided examples demonstrate how an attacker can manipulate input parameters (like 'id') to inject malicious SQL code into database queries. This could allow them to:\n * Retrieve sensitive data like usernames, passwords, or financial information.\n * Modify existing data, potentially causing disruption or data corruption.\n * Execute arbitrary commands on the database server, giving them complete control.\n\n* **Command Injection:** If the application allows user input that directly executes system commands (e.g., through shell scripting), attackers could inject malicious commands to:\n * Steal files from the server.\n * Install malware or backdoors.\n * Gain elevated privileges on the system.\n\n* **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS):** If the application doesn't properly sanitize user input, attackers could inject malicious JavaScript code into web pages viewed by other users. This could allow them to:\n * Steal user cookies and session information.\n * Redirect users to phishing websites.\n * Deface the website or display harmful content.\n\n* **Denial of Service (DoS):** Attackers could exploit insecure configurations to overload the application server with traffic, making it unavailable to legitimate users. This could be achieved through:\n * Sending a large number of requests simultaneously (a DDoS attack).\n * Exploiting vulnerabilities that allow for resource exhaustion.\n\n* **Information Disclosure:** The context mentions \"detailed error messages\" being returned to users. This could expose sensitive information like:\n * Stack traces revealing internal workings of the application.\n * Component versions, potentially indicating known vulnerabilities.\n * Database schema details.\n\n\n\n**Important Note:** The specific vulnerabilities exploitable depend heavily on the exact configuration and code of the application servers and databases. The penetration tester would need to conduct a thorough analysis to identify all potential weaknesses. \n","11":"Relying solely on password complexity and rotation as security measures for authentication presents several significant risks:\n\n* **Encourages Weak Passwords:** As mentioned in the context, users often end up creating weak passwords that meet complexity requirements but are still easily guessable or crackable. They may also reuse these weak passwords across multiple platforms, increasing vulnerability.\n* **Vulnerable to Password Cracking:** Attackers can use automated tools and techniques to brute-force or dictionary attack passwords, especially if they have access to a large number of potential combinations due to password complexity rules.\n\n* **Ignores Human Error:** Users are prone to making mistakes, forgetting complex passwords, or falling victim to phishing attacks that steal their credentials.\n* **Password Oracles:** Incorrectly implemented systems can inadvertently reveal whether a password is valid or invalid during an attack, providing valuable information to attackers.\n\n\n**The context emphasizes the importance of multi-factor authentication (MFA) as a much stronger security measure.** MFA adds additional layers of verification beyond just a password, making it significantly harder for attackers to gain unauthorized access. \n","12":"Based on the provided context, here are some security measures to protect sensitive data like passwords and financial information during transmission and storage:\n\n**Data Minimization & Storage:**\n\n* **Don't store sensitive data unnecessarily:** Only retain data required for operational purposes. Discard it securely as soon as possible. \n* **Tokenization or Truncation:** For data that must be stored, consider PCI DSS compliant tokenization (replacing sensitive data with non-sensitive tokens) or truncation (removing unnecessary portions of the data).\n\n**Encryption:**\n\n* **Encrypt all sensitive data at rest:** Use strong encryption algorithms to protect data stored on servers, databases, and devices.\n* **Encrypt data in transit:** Employ protocols like HTTPS with TLS\/SSL to secure communication channels between applications and users.\n\n**Key Management & Algorithm Selection:**\n\n* **Use up-to-date and strong algorithms, protocols, and keys:** Regularly update cryptographic libraries and ensure you're using industry-standard algorithms (avoid outdated or weak ones).\n* **Implement robust key management practices:** Securely generate, store, rotate, and destroy cryptographic keys. \n\n**Additional Considerations:**\n\n* **Address Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs):** Specifically, avoid hard-coded passwords (CWE-259), broken or risky crypto algorithms (CWE-327), and insufficient entropy in key generation (CWE-331).\n* **Secure Design Principles:** Integrate security into the application design process from the start. Conduct thorough threat modeling and implement secure coding practices to prevent vulnerabilities. \n* **Compliance Requirements:** Adhere to relevant regulations like GDPR and PCI DSS, which mandate specific security controls for handling sensitive data.\n\n\nRemember, cybersecurity is a continuous process. Regularly review your security measures, stay informed about emerging threats, and adapt your defenses accordingly.","13":"The provided context highlights a critical issue: **the application's security logging and monitoring are ineffective.** \n\nBecause penetration tests and DAST scans don't trigger alerts, the system is blind to real-time attacks. This means even if an attacker exploits vulnerabilities like SQL injection (as described in the example), the application won't detect it immediately. \n\n**Here's why this is a problem:**\n\n* **Delayed Response:** Without alerts, security teams can't respond promptly to attacks. This allows attackers more time to exploit vulnerabilities, steal data, or cause damage.\n* **Increased Risk:** The lack of real-time monitoring significantly increases the risk of successful attacks and their consequences (data breaches, financial losses, reputational damage).\n\n**To address this, developers and security teams must:**\n\n1. **Implement Robust Security Logging:** Log all critical events related to user activity, system changes, and potential threats.\n2. **Set Effective Alerting Thresholds:** Configure the system to generate alerts for suspicious activities or events that deviate from normal patterns.\n3. **Establish Clear Response Escalation Processes:** Define procedures for security teams to follow when alerts are triggered, ensuring a timely and coordinated response.\n\n\nBy fixing these issues, the application can gain the ability to detect and respond to real-time attacks, significantly reducing its vulnerability. \n","14":"Based on the context provided, here are some common vulnerabilities arising from improper validation and sanitization of user-supplied data:\n\n* **Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - CWE-79:** Attackers can inject malicious scripts into web pages viewed by other users. This allows them to steal cookies, hijack sessions, or deface websites.\n* **SQL Injection - CWE-89:** Attackers can insert SQL code into data inputs, potentially allowing them to read sensitive database information, modify data, or even execute commands on the underlying database server.\n* **External Control of File Name or Path - CWE-73:** Attackers can manipulate file names or paths used by the application, leading to unauthorized access to files, directory traversal, or even the execution of arbitrary code.\n\n**Mitigation Strategies:**\n\n* **Input Validation:** Always validate user input against expected data types, formats, and lengths. Reject any input that doesn't meet these criteria.\n* **Sanitization:** Encode or escape user-supplied data before using it in dynamic queries, HTML output, or other contexts where it could be interpreted as code.\n* **Parameterized Queries:** Use parameterized queries (or prepared statements) to separate data from SQL commands, preventing attackers from injecting malicious code.\n* **Output Encoding:** Encode all user-supplied data that is displayed on web pages to prevent XSS attacks. \n* **Regular Security Testing:** Conduct regular penetration testing and vulnerability scans to identify potential weaknesses in your application.\n* **Keep Components Updated:** Regularly update libraries, frameworks, and other software components to patch known vulnerabilities.\n\n**Additional Considerations:**\n\n* **Context Awareness:** Understand the context in which user-supplied data is used. For example, data intended for display on a web page should be treated differently than data used in database queries.\n* **Least Privilege Principle:** Grant applications only the minimum privileges necessary to perform their functions. This helps limit the damage that can be caused by a security breach.\n* **Secure Coding Practices:** Follow secure coding guidelines and best practices to minimize the risk of introducing vulnerabilities in your application code. \n\n\nRemember, a layered approach to security is essential. Combining input validation, sanitization, parameterized queries, and other measures will significantly reduce the risk of exploitation.","15":"The context highlights several specific weaknesses in cryptography that contribute to the exposure of sensitive data:\n\n\n* **Use of Hard-coded Passwords (CWE-259):** Hard-coding passwords directly into applications makes them easily accessible to attackers if the code is compromised. This eliminates any encryption or security measure protecting the password.\n\n* **Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithms (CWE-327):** Employing outdated or known weak cryptographic algorithms like MD5, SHA1, or deprecated padding methods like PKCS #1 v1.5 leaves data vulnerable to attacks. Attackers can exploit these weaknesses to decipher sensitive information. \n\n* **Insufficient Entropy (CWE-331):** Using insufficiently random values for cryptographic keys weakens the security of encryption. Attackers can potentially predict or manipulate these weak keys, compromising the confidentiality of data.\n\n\nThese weaknesses demonstrate how failing to implement robust and up-to-date cryptographic practices directly exposes sensitive data, making it a major security concern. \n","16":"Integrating security specialists early in the software development lifecycle (SDLC) allows them to:\n\n* **Influence Secure Design:** They can help architects and developers design applications with security baked in from the start, avoiding common vulnerabilities that are harder to fix later. \n* **Conduct Threat Modeling:** Early threat modeling identifies potential weaknesses before code is written, guiding developers to build more robust defenses.\n* **Provide Security Expertise:** Specialists can offer guidance on secure coding practices, authentication mechanisms, data protection, and other critical security aspects throughout the development process.\n* **Review Code for Vulnerabilities:** Regular code reviews by security experts can catch potential vulnerabilities before they reach production, saving time and resources in the long run. \n* **Promote a Security-First Culture:** Early involvement fosters a culture where security is everyone's responsibility, leading to more secure applications overall.\n\n\nEssentially, bringing security specialists into the SDLC early on ensures that security considerations are not an afterthought but an integral part of the development process, resulting in more resilient and secure applications. \n","17":"Here's how penetration testers can assess the effectiveness of access controls in this context, focusing on minimizing CORS and enforcing record ownership:\n\n**1. Test for Minimized CORS Usage:**\n\n* **Identify Exposed APIs:** Use tools like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP to discover all publicly accessible APIs within the application.\n* **CORS Header Analysis:** Examine the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header for each API response. \n * Ideally, it should be very restrictive, allowing only specific origins (e.g., your own domain) or set to `null` to completely block cross-origin requests.\n * Look for overly permissive headers like `*`, which allow any origin to access the API \u2013 a major security vulnerability.\n* **Test with Different Origins:** Attempt to make requests from different origins (e.g., `https:\/\/attacker.com`) to see if CORS restrictions are enforced.\n\n**2. Assess Record Ownership Enforcement:**\n\n* **Privilege Escalation Attacks:** Attempt to gain access to data or functionality that shouldn't be accessible based on the user's role.\n * Example: A standard user trying to modify another user's account information, or accessing sensitive admin logs.\n* **Input Validation Testing:** Inject malicious or unexpected data into inputs designed to control record access (e.g., user IDs). See if the application allows unauthorized modifications or queries based on manipulated input.\n* **JWT\/Token Manipulation:** If JWTs are used for authentication, try:\n * Modifying the `sub` (subject) claim to impersonate a different user.\n * Replaying captured tokens to gain unauthorized access.\n\n**3. Verify Server-Side Security Measures:**\n\n* **Review Code for Access Control Logic:** Analyze the application's source code to ensure that:\n * All database queries are parameterized and input is properly sanitized to prevent SQL injection attacks.\n * Business logic rules effectively enforce record ownership constraints.\n* **Test Input Validation Robustness:** Try various types of malicious inputs (e.g., special characters, large values) to see if the application handles them correctly and prevents unauthorized access.\n\n**Additional Considerations:**\n\n* **Continuous Testing:** Integrate security testing into the development lifecycle. Conduct regular penetration tests and code reviews to identify vulnerabilities early on.\n* **Security Awareness Training:** Educate developers and QA staff about common access control vulnerabilities and best practices for secure coding.\n\n\nBy following these steps, penetration testers can effectively assess the effectiveness of the application's access control mechanisms and provide recommendations for improvement. \n","18":"Based on the context provided, **yes**, an attacker could exploit Java serialization to achieve remote code execution (RCE) using tools like Java Serial Killer.\n\nHere's why:\n\n* **The application uses Java serialization for user state:** This means that user data is being converted into a format that can be read and executed by Java code.\n* **The attacker notices the \"rO0\" signature:** This indicates a serialized Java object, confirming their suspicion about the application's use of serialization.\n* **Java Serial Killer exploits vulnerabilities in deserialization:** This tool allows attackers to craft malicious serialized data that, when deserialized by the vulnerable application, executes arbitrary code on the server.\n\n\nThe context highlights how the developers' attempt to ensure immutability through serialization inadvertently created a security vulnerability. \n","19":"## Insecure Design vs. Insecure Implementation: Key Differences \n\nHere's a breakdown of the key differences between insecure design and insecure implementation based on the provided context:\n\n**Insecure Design:**\n\n* **Root Cause:** Fundamental flaws in the architecture, structure, or logic of a system *before* coding begins.\n* **Examples:** Lack of threat modeling, neglecting security controls during planning, using vulnerable design patterns, inadequate input validation.\n* **Impact:** Weakened security posture from the ground up, making it difficult to mitigate vulnerabilities even with perfect implementation. \n* **CWEs:** CWE-209, CWE-256, CWE-501, CWE-522 (as listed in the context)\n\n**Insecure Implementation:**\n\n* **Root Cause:** Mistakes or oversights made during the coding and development process.\n* **Examples:** Using weak cryptographic algorithms, storing credentials insecurely, failing to sanitize user input, neglecting security updates.\n* **Impact:** Vulnerabilities that can be exploited even if the design itself is sound. \n* **Remediation:** Often fixable through code revisions, patches, and secure coding practices.\n\n**Key Takeaways:**\n\n* **Insecure design cannot be fixed by a perfect implementation.** It requires revisiting the fundamental architecture and security controls from the start.\n* **Insecure implementation can be addressed through code fixes and best practices.**\n\n\nThink of it like building a house: A bad foundation (insecure design) will always lead to problems, even if the walls and roof are built perfectly (secure implementation). \n","20":"Rate limiting API and controller access can help mitigate the impact of automated attacks by controlling the number of requests that a single entity (like a bot) can make within a specific timeframe. \n\nHere's how it works:\n\n* **Prevents Brute-Force Attacks:** Automated attackers often use brute-force techniques to guess credentials or exploit vulnerabilities. Rate limiting can thwart these attempts by slowing down or blocking excessive login requests, preventing them from overwhelming your system.\n* **Disrupts Script Kiddie Attacks:** Many basic attacks rely on scripts that send a large number of requests quickly. Rate limiting can disrupt these scripts, making it harder for attackers to achieve their goals.\n* **Minimizes Damage from Successful Exploits:** Even if an attacker successfully exploits a vulnerability, rate limiting can help contain the damage by restricting the number of resources they can access or manipulate.\n\nEssentially, rate limiting acts as a safety valve, preventing malicious activity from gaining momentum and causing widespread harm. \n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions about cybersecurity!","21":"Leaving default accounts in an admin console un changed poses significant security risks:\n\n* **Easy Access:** Attackers often have lists of common default usernames and passwords for various software, including admin consoles. Using these readily available credentials, they can gain immediate access to sensitive system settings and user data. \n* **Lateral Movement:** Once inside the system through a default account, attackers can leverage this access to move laterally, compromising other systems or accounts with higher privileges.\n* **Data Exfiltration:** With administrative control, attackers can easily steal confidential information, such as customer data, financial records, or intellectual property.\n\n**How Attackers Exploit This:**\n\n1. **Credential Guessing:** Attackers use tools and scripts to systematically try default credentials until they gain access.\n2. **Publicly Available Information:** Default credentials might be leaked online through forums, security databases, or even the vendor's own support documentation.\n3. **Automated Attacks:** Attackers use bots and malware to scan networks and target systems with known default accounts.\n\n**Mitigation:**\n\n* **Immediately Change Default Credentials:** Upon installation or deployment of any system, change all default usernames and passwords to strong, unique combinations.\n* **Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):** Add an extra layer of security by requiring users to provide multiple forms of authentication, such as a password and a one-time code from their phone.\n* **Regularly Review User Permissions:** Ensure that only authorized personnel have access to sensitive systems and data.\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions!","22":"During refinement sessions, threat modeling can be used to identify potential security risks associated with changes in data flows and access controls within a user story by:\n\n1. **Analyzing Data Flow Changes:** Examine how the user story modifies existing data flows or introduces new ones. Identify points where sensitive data is transferred, stored, or processed. \n2. **Evaluating Access Control Modifications:** Assess how the user story impacts access controls. Determine if new permissions are granted, existing ones are revoked, or if there are changes to authentication mechanisms.\n\n3. **Identifying Potential Attack Vectors:** For each change in data flow and access control, brainstorm potential attack vectors that could exploit vulnerabilities. Consider scenarios like unauthorized data access, data modification, denial of service, or injection attacks. \n4. **Assessing Risk Impact:** Evaluate the potential impact of each identified threat vector. Determine the severity of the consequences if a successful attack were to occur (e.g., data breach, system downtime, financial loss).\n5. **Developing Mitigation Strategies:** Propose security controls and safeguards to mitigate the identified risks. This could involve implementing stronger access controls, encryption, input validation, logging, or other relevant measures. \n\n**Example:**\n\nLet's say a user story involves adding a new feature that allows users to download their personal data in a CSV format. During the refinement session, threat modeling might reveal:\n\n* **Data Flow Change:** Sensitive user data (e.g., name, address, financial information) will now be transferred from the database to the user's browser.\n* **Potential Attack Vector:** An attacker could inject malicious code into the downloaded CSV file to steal user data or spread malware. \n\n**Mitigation Strategy:**\n\n* Implement robust input validation and sanitization on the user-provided parameters used for generating the CSV file.\n* Encrypt the downloaded CSV file using a strong encryption algorithm.\n* Log all downloads of personal data, including user ID, timestamp, and file size.\n\n\nBy integrating threat modeling into refinement sessions, development teams can proactively identify and address security risks early in the software development lifecycle, leading to more secure and resilient applications. \n","23":"Using hard-coded passwords, weak cryptographic algorithms, and insufficient entropy in data protection poses **severe security risks** when handling sensitive data like financial information or personal records. Here's why:\n\n* **Hard-coded Passwords (CWE-259):** These are easily discoverable by attackers through code inspection or reverse engineering. This grants them direct access to systems and data, bypassing any authentication measures. \n* **Weak Cryptographic Algorithms (CWE-327):** Algorithms like DES or RC4 are outdated and vulnerable to known attacks. Attackers can potentially decrypt sensitive information protected by these algorithms, compromising confidentiality and integrity.\n* **Insufficient Entropy (CWE-331):** Low entropy in random number generation used for encryption keys or other cryptographic purposes leads to predictable outputs. This allows attackers to decipher the encryption, exposing sensitive data.\n\nThe consequences of these vulnerabilities can be devastating:\n\n* **Data Breaches:** Sensitive information like financial details, personal IDs, and health records can be stolen, leading to identity theft, financial losses, and reputational damage for individuals and organizations.\n* **Financial Fraud:** Attackers can exploit weak cryptography to intercept and manipulate financial transactions, resulting in significant financial losses.\n* **Regulatory Fines:** Organizations handling sensitive data are subject to strict regulations like GDPR and PCI DSS. Failure to implement adequate security measures can result in hefty fines and legal penalties.\n\n**It's crucial to prioritize strong security practices:**\n\n* Use unique, complex passwords and multi-factor authentication.\n* Employ robust cryptographic algorithms like AES-256 and SHA-256.\n* Ensure sufficient entropy in random number generators used for cryptographic purposes.\n* Regularly update systems and software to patch vulnerabilities.\n\n\nBy addressing these weaknesses, organizations can significantly reduce the risk of data breaches and protect sensitive information. \n","24":"Here are some examples of CWEs under the 'Broken Authentication' category and how they relate to identification failures:\n\n* **CWE-297: Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch:** This CWE occurs when a system fails to properly verify the digital certificate presented by a website or server. An attacker could present a fake certificate that appears legitimate, tricking users into believing they are interacting with a trusted site. This leads to an identification failure because the user is unable to reliably determine the true identity of the website they are interacting with.\n\n* **CWE-287: Improper Authentication:** This broad category encompasses various vulnerabilities where authentication mechanisms are weak or improperly implemented. Examples include using easily guessable passwords, failing to implement multi-factor authentication, or storing credentials insecurely. These failures directly lead to identification failures because attackers can bypass legitimate authentication processes and impersonate users.\n\n* **CWE-384: Session Fixation:** In this attack, an attacker tricks a user into accepting a pre-determined session ID. When the user later logs in, they are unknowingly assigned the attacker's chosen session ID, allowing the attacker to hijack their session and assume their identity. This is a clear identification failure because the legitimate user's identity is compromised.\n\n\n**In essence, all these CWEs contribute to identification failures by undermining the ability of systems to accurately verify and confirm the identity of users.** This opens the door for various attacks where attackers can impersonate legitimate users, access sensitive information, or perform unauthorized actions. \n","25":"If an unauthenticated user can access an administrative page intended for authorized personnel, several severe vulnerabilities arise:\n\n* **Data Breaches:** The attacker could potentially view sensitive data like customer information, financial records, or internal company documents. \n* **System Manipulation:** An attacker might be able to modify system settings, configurations, or even execute malicious code, leading to complete control over the affected systems.\n* **Privilege Escalation:** The attacker could exploit vulnerabilities on the administrative page to gain higher privileges within the system, allowing them to access even more sensitive data and functions.\n* **Denial of Service (DoS):** An attacker could disrupt normal operations by altering settings, deleting files, or overloading the server with requests.\n\n\nEssentially, granting unauthenticated users access to an administrative page opens a Pandora's box of potential security risks that can severely compromise the integrity and confidentiality of your systems and data. \n","26":"## Effective Logging of Security Events for Malicious Activity Detection\n\nBased on the provided context, here's how login failures, access control breaches, and server-side input validation errors can be logged effectively:\n\n**1. Data to Log:**\n\n* **User Context:**\n * Username or unique user identifier \n * IP address of the originating device\n * Timestamp of the event\n * User agent string (browser\/OS information)\n * Referrer URL (if applicable)\n * Client location (country, city if possible)\n* **Event Details:**\n * Type of event (login attempt, access control violation, input validation error)\n * Specific action attempted (e.g., login with specific credentials, accessing a restricted resource, submitting invalid data)\n * Result of the action (success\/failure, error code if applicable)\n * Any relevant system information (e.g., affected server, database queried)\n\n**2. Formatting for Security Monitoring Tools:**\n\nUse standardized log formats like:\n\n* **JSON:** Widely supported and human-readable, allowing easy parsing and analysis by security tools. \n* **Syslog:** Industry standard format with predefined message types and severity levels.\n\nExample JSON Log Entry:\n\n```json\n{\n \"timestamp\": \"2023-10-26T15:30:00Z\",\n \"user_id\": \"user123\",\n \"ip_address\": \"192.168.1.10\",\n \"event_type\": \"login_attempt\",\n \"result\": \"failure\",\n \"error_code\": \"invalid_credentials\",\n \"client_location\": {\n \"country\": \"US\",\n \"city\": \"New York\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n**3. Encoding and Storage:**\n\n* **Secure Encoding:** Encode sensitive log data (e.g., usernames, passwords) using techniques like Base64 or hashing to prevent injection attacks and protect against data breaches.\n* **Append-Only Databases:** Use databases with append-only functionality to ensure log integrity and prevent tampering. This can be achieved through technologies like:\n * Logstash + Elasticsearch + Kibana (ELK stack)\n * Apache Kafka\n\n**4. Monitoring and Alerting:**\n\n* Implement real-time monitoring of security logs using Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems or log analytics platforms.\n* Configure alerts for suspicious activities based on predefined rules, such as:\n * Multiple failed login attempts within a short time frame\n * Access to restricted resources by unauthorized users\n * Unexpected input patterns during server-side validation\n\n\nBy following these guidelines, organizations can effectively log security events, enrich them with user context, and format the data for easy consumption by security monitoring tools. This enables proactive threat detection, incident response, and continuous improvement of security posture.","27":"Security logging and monitoring moved up in the OWASP Top 10 rankings from 2017 to 2023 because of its **increasing importance in detecting, escalating, and responding to active breaches.** \n\nThe context highlights that:\n\n* **Logging and monitoring are crucial for accountability, visibility, incident alerting, and forensics.**\n* The category now encompasses a broader range of vulnerabilities beyond just insufficient logging. This includes improper output neutralization for logs, omission of security-relevant information, and insertion of sensitive information into log files.\n\n\nThe OWASP community recognized the growing need to address these weaknesses as they directly impact an organization's ability to effectively handle security incidents. \n","28":"Based on the context provided, here are some automated tools attackers can use to identify systems with unpatched vulnerabilities like Heartbleed:\n\n* **Shodan:** As mentioned in the text, Shodan is an IoT search engine that can help find devices still vulnerable to known exploits like Heartbleed. \n\n**Other tools attackers might use include:**\n\n* **Nmap:** A widely used network scanner that can detect open ports and services, revealing potential vulnerabilities based on known service versions.\n* **Nessus:** A vulnerability scanner that performs comprehensive scans of systems and networks, identifying a wide range of vulnerabilities, including those patched in April 2014 (like Heartbleed).\n\n**Examples of vulnerabilities attackers can exploit:**\n\nThe context mentions:\n\n* **CVE-2017-5638 (Struts 2):** A remote code execution vulnerability that allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable servers. This highlights the danger of unpatched web application frameworks.\n* **Heartbleed:** While patched in April 2014, some systems might still be vulnerable. Exploiting Heartbleed allows attackers to steal sensitive data like passwords and encryption keys from memory.\n\n\n**Remember:** Attackers constantly develop new tools and exploit previously unknown vulnerabilities. Staying up-to-date on security best practices, patching systems promptly, and using robust security measures are crucial for mitigating these risks. \n","29":"Based on the context provided, a common vulnerability that enables attackers to execute arbitrary code on a server is **CVE-2017-5638**, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability. \n\nThe context states: *\"CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server, has been blamed for significant breaches.\"*\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions! \n","30":"Here's how penetration testing can be integrated into user story development to identify vulnerabilities related to data flow changes and access control mechanisms, based on your provided context:\n\n**1. Threat Modeling During Refinement:**\n\n* **Incorporate Penetration Testing Expertise:** Include a cybersecurity professional (or someone with penetration testing experience) in the refinement sessions where user stories are discussed and developed.\n* **Data Flow & Access Control Focus:** During these sessions, specifically focus on identifying potential changes to data flows and access control mechanisms introduced by each user story.\n\n**2. Penetration Testing as Part of User Story Acceptance Criteria:**\n\n* **Define Testable Security Requirements:** Explicitly state security-related acceptance criteria within each user story. These criteria should outline how data flow and access control are intended to function securely. Examples:\n * \"The system must prevent unauthorized access to user account information by verifying all input parameters before executing SQL queries.\"\n * \"Error messages returned to users must not contain sensitive information such as stack traces or component versions.\"\n* **Penetration Testing for Verification:** Include a penetration testing phase as part of the acceptance criteria for each user story. This can be a manual or automated assessment focused on:\n * **Data Flow Validation:** Tracing how data moves through the system and ensuring it follows the intended paths, with proper authorization checks at each stage.\n * **Access Control Testing:** Verifying that users only have access to the resources they are authorized to access, based on their roles and permissions.\n\n**3. Continuous Feedback Loop:**\n\n* **Integrate Findings into Development:** The results of penetration tests should be fed back into the development team promptly. This allows for quick remediation of vulnerabilities before they become more serious issues.\n* **Iterative Improvement:** Use penetration testing findings to refine user stories and security requirements, creating a continuous cycle of improvement.\n\n**Example: User Story \"User can view their own profile information\"**\n\n* **Acceptance Criteria (Security Focus):** \n * The system must authenticate the user before allowing access to their profile information.\n * Access to other users' profiles must be denied.\n * Error messages returned to users attempting unauthorized access should not reveal sensitive information.\n* **Penetration Testing:** A tester would attempt to access profiles without authentication, try to access other users' profiles, and analyze error messages for potential leaks.\n\n**Benefits:**\n\n* **Early Vulnerability Detection:** Identifying vulnerabilities during the development phase is significantly cheaper and easier than fixing them later.\n* **Improved Security Design:** Integrating penetration testing encourages developers to think about security from the beginning, leading to more robust designs.\n* **Reduced Risk:** By proactively addressing vulnerabilities, organizations can minimize their exposure to cyberattacks and data breaches.\n\n\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions or would like to explore specific scenarios in more detail!","31":"Based on the context provided, here are some tools you can use to continuously inventory and monitor versions of client-side and server-side components for vulnerabilities:\n\n**Inventorying Component Versions:**\n\n* **versions (CLI tool):** This command-line tool is excellent for quickly determining the versions of various software packages installed on a system.\n* **OWASP Dependency Check:** This open-source tool analyzes project dependencies (like Maven, Gradle, npm, etc.) to identify known vulnerabilities and outdated components.\n* **retire.js:** A Node.js library that scans package.json files for outdated or vulnerable dependencies. It can help you prioritize updates based on severity.\n\n**Monitoring for Vulnerabilities:**\n\n* **Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) Database:** A comprehensive database of publicly disclosed security vulnerabilities. Regularly check this database against your inventory of components.\n* **National Vulnerability Database (NVD):** Maintained by NIST, the NVD provides detailed vulnerability information, including severity ratings and available mitigation strategies. \n* **Software Composition Analysis (SCA) Tools:** These tools automate the process of dependency analysis and vulnerability scanning. Popular options include:\n * **Sonatype Nexus Lifecycle**\n * **Snyk**\n * **JFrog Xray**\n* **Security Bulletins and Advisories:** Subscribe to email alerts from software vendors, security researchers, and organizations like CERT\/CC for updates on vulnerabilities affecting your used components.\n\n**How to Use These Tools:**\n\n1. **Inventory:** Use tools like `versions`, OWASP Dependency Check, or retire.js to create a list of all client-side and server-side components you use, including their versions and dependencies.\n2. **Monitor:** Regularly scan your component inventory against CVE databases (like NVD), security advisories, and SCA tools to identify known vulnerabilities.\n3. **Prioritize:** Based on severity ratings and potential impact, prioritize the patching or mitigation of identified vulnerabilities.\n4. **Automate:** Implement automated workflows for vulnerability scanning, reporting, and remediation to streamline your process.\n\n**Remember:** Continuous monitoring is crucial! Regularly update your component inventory and scan for new vulnerabilities to maintain a secure environment. \n\n\n","32":"Based on the context you provided, here are some common consequences of access control failures during a penetration test:\n\n* **Unauthorized Information Disclosure:** Attackers could gain access to sensitive data like customer information, financial records, or proprietary code due to misconfigured permissions or vulnerabilities in access controls. Scenario #3 highlights this with detailed error messages revealing potentially sensitive information.\n* **Data Modification or Destruction:** Access control failures can allow attackers to alter or delete critical data, disrupting operations and potentially causing significant financial or reputational damage.\n\n* **Performing Actions Outside User Limits:** Attackers might exploit weaknesses to execute functions they shouldn't have access to, such as deleting user accounts, changing system configurations, or even launching further attacks on the network. Scenario #4 demonstrates this with default sharing permissions allowing unauthorized access and modification of data within a cloud storage environment.\n\n\nThe high incidence rate (3.81%) and prevalence (over 318k occurrences) of broken access control in applications emphasize its importance as a target during penetration tests. \n","33":"Given that penetration testing and DAST tools like OWASP ZAP aren't triggering alerts, the application's current security posture relies heavily on passive vulnerability detection. To improve real-time or near real-time attack detection and response, consider these steps:\n\n**1. Implement Robust Security Logging:**\n\n* **Log Everything:** Capture detailed information about all user actions, system events, API calls, database queries, and network traffic. \n* **Standardize Log Formats:** Use a consistent format (e.g., JSON) for easier analysis and correlation.\n* **Centralize Logs:** Aggregate logs from all application components into a central log management system.\n\n**2. Configure Effective Alerting Thresholds:**\n\n* **Define Critical Events:** Establish clear criteria for what constitutes a security-relevant event (e.g., failed login attempts, unusual data access patterns, suspicious network connections).\n* **Set Appropriate Alert Levels:** Use different alert levels (info, warning, critical) to prioritize responses based on severity.\n* **Real-Time Notifications:** Configure alerts to be delivered in real-time through email, SMS, or dedicated security dashboards.\n\n**3. Utilize Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS\/IPS):**\n\n* **Network-based IDS\/IPS:** Monitor network traffic for known attack signatures and patterns.\n* **Host-based IDS\/IPS:** Analyze system logs and activity on individual servers for malicious behavior.\n\n**4. Implement Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) System:**\n\n* **Log Correlation:** SIEM systems can correlate security events from multiple sources to identify potential attacks or anomalies.\n* **Threat Intelligence Integration:** Integrate threat intelligence feeds into your SIEM to enhance detection capabilities.\n* **Automated Response:** Configure SIEMs to automate responses to detected threats, such as blocking malicious IPs or quarantining infected hosts.\n\n**5. Continuous Monitoring and Improvement:**\n\n* **Regularly Review Logs:** Analyze security logs for patterns and potential incidents.\n* **Update Security Rules:** Continuously update IDS\/IPS rules and threat intelligence feeds to stay ahead of emerging threats.\n* **Conduct Penetration Testing:** Perform regular penetration tests to identify vulnerabilities that may not be detected by passive monitoring tools.\n\n\n\nBy implementing these measures, you can significantly enhance your application's ability to detect and respond to active attacks in real-time or near real-time. \n","34":"If an unauthenticated user can access pages intended for authenticated users, several vulnerabilities emerge:\n\n* **Data Breaches:** Unauthenticated users could potentially view sensitive information not meant for public access, such as personal data, financial records, or internal company documents. \n* **Account Takeover:** Attackers might exploit weaknesses in the authentication process to steal user credentials or hijack accounts by accessing features designed for logged-in users.\n* **System Manipulation:** Access to unauthorized pages could allow attackers to modify data, execute malicious code, or disrupt system functionality. For example, they might be able to change account settings, delete files, or even gain control of the entire system.\n* **Spoofing and Impersonation:** Attackers could impersonate authenticated users to deceive other users or systems, potentially leading to fraudulent activities or damage to reputation.\n\nEssentially, bypassing authentication grants attackers a foothold within your system, allowing them to exploit various vulnerabilities and cause significant harm. \n\n\nLet me know if you have any more questions! \n","35":"Based on the context provided, a web application fetching a remote resource without validating user-supplied URLs indicates a **Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** vulnerability. \n\nThis means an attacker could manipulate the URL input to force the application to make requests to unintended targets, potentially:\n\n* **Accessing sensitive internal data:** The attacker could retrieve confidential information from the server's own systems or databases.\n* **Launching attacks against other systems:** The compromised application could be used as a proxy to attack other servers or services within the same network or even external ones.\n* **Executing arbitrary code on the server:** In some cases, SSRF vulnerabilities can lead to remote code execution, allowing the attacker to take complete control of the server.\n\nThe context highlights that SSRF is becoming increasingly common and severe due to the complexity of modern web architectures and the use of cloud services. \n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions about SSRF or cybersecurity! \n","36":"In the context of a penetration test where access control mechanisms fail, the potential consequences can be severe:\n\n* **Unauthorized Data Access:** Attackers could potentially gain access to sensitive information such as customer data, financial records, or intellectual property. This could lead to identity theft, financial loss, and reputational damage for the organization.\n* **Data Modification or Deletion:** Attackers might be able to alter or delete critical data, disrupting business operations, compromising system integrity, and leading to legal and financial repercussions.\n* **System Takeover:** Successful exploitation of broken access control could allow attackers to gain complete control over systems and applications, enabling them to launch further attacks, install malware, or hold the organization hostage through ransomware.\n\n**Specifically, in relation to the scenarios provided:**\n\n* **Scenario #3:** Detailed error messages revealing sensitive information like stack traces or vulnerable component versions can provide valuable insights to attackers, helping them plan more targeted and effective attacks.\n* **Scenario #4:** Default sharing permissions open to the internet allow anyone to access sensitive data stored within cloud storage, leading to potential breaches of privacy, intellectual property theft, and regulatory non-compliance.\n\n\nFailing to address broken access control vulnerabilities during a penetration test can have cascading negative effects, exposing the organization to significant risks and potentially resulting in costly damages. \n","37":"Based on the provided context, here are some key security considerations for building and deploying software within a secure software supply chain:\n\n**1. Source Code Integrity:**\n\n* **Trusted Repositories:** Always pull libraries and dependencies from reputable sources like official npm or Maven repositories. For high-risk projects, consider hosting your own internal repository with vetted components.\n* **Vulnerability Scanning:** Utilize tools like OWASP Dependency Check or CycloneDX to scan your codebase and dependencies for known vulnerabilities before incorporating them into your project.\n\n**2. Development Process Security:**\n\n* **Code Review:** Implement a rigorous code review process to catch potential vulnerabilities, malicious code insertions, or misconfigurations early in the development cycle.\n* **Secure CI\/CD Pipeline:** Your continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI\/CD) pipeline needs:\n * **Segregation:** Separate environments for development, testing, and production to minimize the risk of contamination.\n * **Configuration Control:** Carefully manage configurations and access controls within the pipeline to prevent unauthorized modifications.\n\n**3. Secure Design Principles:**\n\n* **Integrate Security from the Start:** Security should be a fundamental part of your software design, not an afterthought. \n* **Secure Development Lifecycle (SDLC):** Adopt a comprehensive SDLC that incorporates secure coding practices, threat modeling, and regular security reviews throughout the entire software lifecycle.\n* **Utilize Secure Design Patterns:** Leverage established secure design patterns to mitigate common vulnerabilities.\n* **Collaboration with Security Experts:** Engage your security team from the initial project planning stages and maintain their involvement throughout development, testing, and deployment.\n\n**4. Maturity Model Guidance:**\n\n* **OWASP SAMM:** Consider using the OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) as a framework to guide your secure software development efforts and assess your current level of maturity.\n\n\n\nBy addressing these key considerations, you can significantly strengthen your software supply chain security and reduce the risk of vulnerabilities being introduced into your applications. \n","38":"Attackers can exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities like the ones described in your context by injecting malicious SQL code into data inputs that are directly used in database queries. \n\nHere's how it works:\n\n1. **Vulnerable Code:** Applications often use user-supplied data (like form inputs) to build SQL queries dynamically. If these applications don't properly sanitize or validate the input, attackers can insert malicious SQL code into these strings.\n2. **Malicious Injection:** The attacker modifies the 'id' parameter in your example scenarios to include malicious SQL statements like `UNION SELECT SLEEP(10);--`. \n3. **Exploitation:** When the application executes the query, the injected code is treated as part of the legitimate SQL command. This can have several consequences:\n\n * **Data Manipulation:** The attacker could modify, delete, or insert data into the database. For example, they could change a user's account balance or grant themselves administrative privileges.\n * **Command Execution:** In some cases, attackers can inject code that executes operating system commands on the server where the database is hosted. This could allow them to gain control of the entire system.\n * **Information Disclosure:** The attacker could extract sensitive information from the database, such as usernames, passwords, credit card numbers, or confidential business data.\n\n**Example Breakdown:**\n\nIn your example `' UNION SELECT SLEEP(10);--`, the attacker uses:\n\n* `UNION`: A SQL command to combine results from multiple queries.\n* `SELECT SLEEP(10);`: A statement that makes the database wait for 10 seconds (a common technique to detect if an injection was successful).\n* `--`: Comments in SQL that are ignored by the database.\n\n**Prevention:**\n\nThe context you provided highlights the importance of source code review and proper input validation. Here are some key prevention strategies:\n\n* **Prepared Statements:** Use parameterized queries (prepared statements) to separate data from SQL commands, preventing direct code injection.\n* **Input Sanitization:** Always sanitize user input by removing or escaping potentially harmful characters before using it in queries.\n* **Least Privilege Principle:** Grant database users only the minimum permissions required for their tasks.\n\n\n\nLet me know if you have any more questions about specific attack scenarios or prevention techniques!","39":"The specific security risk associated with returning detailed error messages, including stack traces, to users in a web application is the **exposure of sensitive information or underlying system flaws**. \n\nHere's why:\n\n* **Sensitive Information Leak:** Stack traces often reveal internal file paths, variable names, and even snippets of code containing confidential data. An attacker could exploit this information to understand how the application works, identify potential vulnerabilities, or even extract sensitive data directly.\n* **Vulnerability Disclosure:** Error messages might inadvertently expose details about the application's framework versions, libraries used, or database configurations. This can alert attackers to known vulnerabilities that they can then exploit.\n\nBy returning overly verbose error messages, developers increase the risk of unintentionally providing attackers with valuable insights into the application's architecture and security posture. \n\n\n","40":"The work factor (or delay factor) in adaptive and salted hashing functions like Argon2, scrypt, bcrypt, or PBKDF2 **controls the computational cost of cracking a hashed password**. \n\nA higher work factor means more processing power is required to reverse the hash, making it significantly harder for attackers to guess or brute-force passwords. This effectively increases the time it takes to crack a password, deterring attackers and enhancing security.\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions about hashing functions or cybersecurity! \n","41":"Based on the context you provided, here are some ways an attacker could bypass access control checks in a web application like the one described:\n\n* **Parameter Tampering:** The attacker could directly modify parameters in the URL to gain unauthorized access. For example, in the scenario \"https:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountInfo?acct=notmyacct\", they might change \"notmyacct\" to their own account ID or a target account ID to view or edit that user's information.\n\n* **Force Browsing:** The attacker could try to directly access protected pages (like the admin page) by simply entering the URL in their browser, bypassing any login or authorization checks. \n\n* **Metadata Manipulation:** If the application relies on JWT tokens, cookies, or hidden fields for authentication and authorization, an attacker could:\n * Replay a valid token obtained from a previous legitimate user session.\n * Tamper with a JWT token to modify claims like user roles or permissions.\n * Exploit vulnerabilities in how the application handles cookie or hidden field expiration and validation.\n\n* **CORS Misconfiguration:** If the application has APIs that are not properly configured for Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS), an attacker could make requests from a malicious website, potentially accessing sensitive data or functionalities they shouldn't have access to.\n\n\n\n**It's important to note:** The context emphasizes that robust access control relies on trusted server-side code and careful handling of metadata. Attackers can often exploit vulnerabilities in the client-side (browser) interactions with the server, which is why secure server-side implementation is crucial. \n","42":"A web application exposing session identifiers in the URL and failing to properly invalidate them during logout presents several significant security risks:\n\n* **Session Hijacking:** An attacker observing a user's URL can easily steal their session ID, allowing them to impersonate the user and access their sensitive information or perform actions on their behalf.\n* **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability:** An attacker could inject malicious scripts into the page that manipulates the session ID, potentially leading to unauthorized access or data theft.\n* **Persistent Session Attacks:** Even after a user logs out, if the session ID is not properly invalidated, an attacker can continue using it for a period of time, gaining unauthorized access to the user's account.\n\nThese vulnerabilities can lead to serious consequences such as:\n\n* **Data Breaches:** Attackers could gain access to confidential user data, such as personal information, financial details, or proprietary company information.\n* **Account Takeover:** Attackers could hijack user accounts and use them for malicious purposes, such as sending spam emails, spreading malware, or launching further attacks.\n* **Reputational Damage:** A security breach can severely damage the reputation of a website or organization, leading to loss of trust and customer confidence.\n\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions about this scenario! \n","43":"Based on the provided context, here are the recommended hashing functions for storing passwords and factors to consider:\n\n**Recommended Hashing Functions:**\n\n* **Argon2:** Considered the current gold standard due to its high security, resistance to attacks, and good performance. \n* **scrypt:** Another strong contender known for its memory-hardness, making it difficult for attackers to use GPUs or specialized hardware for brute-force attacks.\n* **bcrypt:** Widely used and well-vetted, bcrypt's strength lies in its adaptive work factor that scales with the available processing power.\n* **PBKDF2 (with a strong underlying hash function like SHA-256):** A versatile option that can be configured with different parameters for varying security levels.\n\n**Factors to Consider:**\n\n* **Security Strength:** Choose a function resistant to known attacks and future cryptanalytic advancements. \n* **Performance:** Consider the computational cost of hashing and unhashing passwords, especially in high-volume systems. Balance security with reasonable performance.\n* **Memory Usage:** Some functions (like scrypt) are memory-hard, which can be beneficial but might impact resource usage on devices with limited memory.\n* **Implementation Quality:** Use well-established and audited implementations of the chosen function to minimize vulnerabilities in your code.\n* **Salting:** Always use unique salts for each password to prevent rainbow table attacks. \n\n\n**Important Note:**\n\nThe context emphasizes avoiding deprecated hash functions like MD5 or SHA1, as they are known to be insecure. Always prioritize the latest and most secure hashing algorithms available.","44":"Based on the context provided, here are some tools and resources recommended for continuously tracking versions and monitoring vulnerabilities:\n\n**Version Tracking:**\n\n* **`versions` (Command-line tool):** Great for quickly checking package versions directly from your terminal. \n* **OWASP Dependency Check:** Analyzes project files to identify known vulnerable dependencies.\n* **retire.js:** A Node.js library that helps you find and track outdated dependencies in your projects.\n\n**Vulnerability Monitoring:**\n\n* **Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) Database:** The authoritative source for publicly disclosed security vulnerabilities. Regularly check the CVE database for updates related to your components.\n* **National Vulnerability Database (NVD):** A comprehensive database maintained by NIST, providing detailed information about vulnerabilities.\n* **Software Composition Analysis (SCA) Tools:** These tools automate the process of identifying vulnerable dependencies within your codebase. Popular options include:\n * **Sonatype Nexus Lifecycle:** Offers vulnerability scanning, dependency management, and remediation guidance.\n * **Snyk:** Provides continuous security monitoring for open-source dependencies across multiple languages and platforms.\n * **Black Duck Hub:** A comprehensive SCA platform that integrates with your development workflow.\n\n**Additional Resources:**\n\n* **Security Bulletins:** Subscribe to security bulletins from component vendors (e.g., operating system, web server, database) to stay informed about known vulnerabilities and patches.\n* **Community Forums & Mailing Lists:** Engage with security communities and mailing lists related to the technologies you use.\n\n\nRemember: Continuously monitoring versions and vulnerabilities is crucial for maintaining a secure software environment. \n","45":"Based on the provided context, **it's possible that deprecated cryptographic padding methods like PKCS number 1 v1.5 are being utilized in the application.** \n\nThe context explicitly lists \"Are deprecated cryptographic padding methods such as PKCS number 1 v1.5 in use?\" as a potential cryptographic failure point. This suggests it's a concern the assessment is looking into.\n\n\nHowever, **the context doesn't definitively state whether or not these methods are actually being used.** You would need to examine the application's code and configuration to determine this for sure. \n","46":"The security vulnerability present is **Broken Access Control**. \n\nSpecifically, this scenario describes a violation of the principle of least privilege. The page in question should only be accessible to authenticated users, but an unauthenticated user can still gain access. This means the access control mechanism is flawed and doesn't properly restrict access based on user authentication status. \n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions! \n","47":"Based on the provided context, here are the key elements of a secure development lifecycle (SDL) and why involving security specialists from the beginning is crucial:\n\n**Key Elements of SDL:**\n\n* **Secure Design Patterns & Components:** Utilizing pre-vetted, secure design patterns and components as building blocks reduces vulnerabilities introduced during development.\n* **Threat Modeling:** Systematically identifying potential threats and vulnerabilities at each stage of the software lifecycle allows for proactive mitigation strategies.\n* **Integration into User Stories:** Embedding security considerations directly within user stories ensures that security is not an afterthought but a core part of feature development.\n* **Plausibility Checks:** Implementing checks at all application tiers (frontend to backend) helps prevent invalid or malicious data from being processed.\n* **Security Testing:** Conducting rigorous unit and integration testing specifically focused on identified threats strengthens the software's resilience.\n* **Tier Segregation:** Separating application layers (and network segments) based on sensitivity and required protection minimizes the impact of potential breaches.\n* **Tenant Segregation:** Robustly separating tenant data across all tiers prevents unauthorized access and cross-contamination.\n\n**Importance of Early Security Specialist Involvement:**\n\nThe context emphasizes that secure design is not an add-on but a fundamental aspect woven into every stage of development. \n\nInvolving security specialists from the beginning:\n\n* **Prevents Insecure Design Choices:** Experts can guide developers in making security-conscious decisions during initial design phases, avoiding costly reworks later.\n* **Promotes Threat Awareness:** Security professionals bring valuable knowledge about potential attack vectors, enabling a more comprehensive threat model and proactive mitigation.\n* **Ensures Security is Embedded:** By integrating security considerations from the outset, it becomes part of the development culture rather than a separate, often neglected process.\n\n\nIn essence, treating security as an integral part of the software development lifecycle, starting at the very beginning, significantly reduces vulnerabilities and enhances the overall security posture of the application. \n","48":"Yes, this is a classic example of **\"Force Browsing\"** which falls under **Broken Access Control**. \n\nHere's why:\n\n* **The URL Structure:** The attacker crafted the URL \"https:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountInfo?acct=notmyacct\" to target the account information page.\n* **Malicious Intent:** By forcing a user to visit this specific URL, the attacker aims to potentially bypass authorization checks. If the application doesn't properly validate the \"acct\" parameter or if there are weaknesses in its access control logic, the attacker could gain unauthorized access to sensitive data associated with an account different from their own.\n\n**The Context reinforces this:**\n\n* **Scenario #2:** Explicitly mentions attackers forcing browsing to target URLs for malicious purposes.\n* **Broken Access Control:** The provided definition highlights \"Force browsing to authenticated pages as an unauthenticated user or to privileged pages as a standard user\" as a key vulnerability.\n\n\nLet me know if you have any other questions about this scenario or cybersecurity concepts! \n","49":"The provided attack scenarios demonstrate **misconfiguration vulnerabilities**. \n\nHere's how these vulnerabilities are exploited to delay or disrupt application operations:\n\n* **Scenario #3:** Returning detailed error messages exposes sensitive information like stack traces and component versions. Attackers can leverage this to understand the application's architecture, identify known vulnerabilities in used components (like CVE-2017-5638 mentioned), and potentially exploit them for code execution or data breaches. This disruption could range from data leaks to complete system takeover.\n\n* **Scenario #4:** Default sharing permissions open to the internet allow attackers to access sensitive data stored within cloud storage. This direct access can lead to data theft, manipulation, or deletion, effectively crippling the application's functionality and potentially causing severe reputational damage.\n\n**In essence, misconfiguration vulnerabilities arise from improper settings and configurations that leave systems and applications exposed.** Attackers exploit these weaknesses to gain unauthorized access, steal information, disrupt services, or even take control of the entire system. \n\n\nLet me know if you have any more questions about specific attack scenarios or vulnerability types! \n"},"ground_truth":{"0":"Access control failures during a penetration test can have severe consequences, including unauthorized information disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive data. Attackers could potentially gain access to confidential information, alter critical system settings, or even disrupt business operations by performing actions outside their authorized limits. These breaches can lead to financial losses, reputational damage, legal ramifications, and even operational downtime. In extreme cases, access control failures can be exploited to gain complete control over the targeted system, creating a serious security risk.","1":"The provided context doesn't explicitly state the vulnerabilities that allowed the airline's data to be exposed for over ten years. The information only mentions the lack of logging and monitoring, which likely contributed to the undetected breach. However, to determine the specific vulnerabilities exploited, further details about the cloud hosting provider's security practices, the nature of the breach, and the exploited weaknesses in their systems are required.","2":"If security settings for application servers, frameworks, libraries, and databases are not set to secure values, a penetration tester could exploit a wide range of vulnerabilities. This includes:\n\n* **Default credentials:** Unchanged default accounts can be easily exploited for unauthorized access. Penetration testers can use readily available lists of default credentials to gain access.\n* **Insecure configuration:** Misconfigured settings, like weak encryption algorithms, open ports, and overly permissive permissions, can lead to data breaches, privilege escalation, and other security issues. This can allow attackers to bypass security measures and access sensitive information.\n* **Missing or insecure security headers:** Lack of or improperly configured security headers (e.g., HSTS, Content Security Policy) can make the application vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS), clickjacking, and other attacks.\n* **Insecure error handling:** Detailed error messages revealing sensitive information, such as stack traces, can be exploited by attackers to understand the application's internal workings and potentially find vulnerabilities.\n* **Outdated software:** Using outdated software with known vulnerabilities can lead to exploitation by attackers. Penetration testers can exploit these vulnerabilities by using readily available exploits or by developing custom exploits for unpatched vulnerabilities.\n* **Weak authentication mechanisms:** Poorly implemented authentication mechanisms, such as weak password policies, lack of two-factor authentication, or vulnerable session management, can be exploited to gain unauthorized access to the system.\n\nPenetration testers will leverage various techniques and tools to identify and exploit these weaknesses in an application's security posture. By understanding these potential vulnerabilities, organizations can prioritize securing their applications and mitigating the risks associated with insecure configurations.","3":"The OWASP Top 10 community survey highlighted the increasing importance of security logging and monitoring, moving it up from tenth position in 2017 to third place in the latest survey. This indicates a growing recognition among security professionals of the crucial role logging and monitoring play in detecting and responding to security threats. While specific recommendations may vary depending on the survey year, the core principles remain consistent: robust logging practices, real-time monitoring capabilities, and the ability to analyze log data effectively are essential components of any comprehensive security strategy.","4":"User-supplied table and column names are dangerous because they can be used to access and modify data outside of the intended scope of the application. For example, an attacker could provide a table name that matches a system table, such as 'information_schema', and then use a column name to retrieve sensitive information about the database. This is particularly dangerous in report-writing software, where users may have the ability to generate reports based on custom data structures, which can be exploited to access sensitive data. Because these structures cannot be escaped, they allow for direct access and modification of data without any filtering or validation.","5":"By manipulating the 'acct' parameter in the browser request, an attacker can directly input any account number they desire. If the application fails to properly verify this input before executing the SQL query, the attacker can bypass security checks and access any user's account information. This vulnerability highlights the importance of input validation to prevent attackers from injecting malicious data into SQL queries.","6":"A secure development lifecycle (SDL) is crucial for preventing vulnerabilities during application development. Here are key steps based on the provided context:\n\n1. **Involve AppSec Professionals:** Integrate security experts from the outset to design and evaluate security and privacy controls. This ensures robust security considerations are built into the application architecture. \n\n2. **Secure Design Patterns and Components:** Leverage pre-built secure design patterns and components to streamline development and minimize vulnerabilities. This provides a foundation of security best practices. \n\n3. **Threat Modeling:** Conduct threat modeling exercises to identify potential vulnerabilities in critical areas such as authentication, authorization, business logic, and key data flows. This helps prioritize security efforts. \n\n4. **Security Language in User Stories:** Incorporate security requirements into user stories and development tasks. This ensures security considerations are addressed throughout the development process. \n\n5. **Plausibility Checks:** Implement plausibility checks at each tier of the application, from the frontend to the backend. This helps validate user inputs and prevent potential attacks. \n\n6. **Security Testing:** Write unit and integration tests to validate that all critical flows are resistant to threats identified in the threat model. Include both use cases and misuse cases to test for vulnerabilities. \n\n7. **Tier Segregation:** Segregate different application tiers (frontend, backend, etc.) on both the system and network layers based on their exposure and protection needs. This helps contain potential breaches. \n\n8. **Robust Tenant Segregation:** Ensure tenants are securely segregated across all application tiers by design. This prevents unauthorized access and data breaches between different user groups. ","7":"Common injection attacks that target dynamic queries and commands include:\n\n* **SQL Injection (SQLi):** Exploits vulnerabilities in SQL queries to manipulate database operations, potentially leading to data theft, modification, or denial of service.\n* **NoSQL Injection:** Targets NoSQL databases, aiming to bypass authentication, gain unauthorized access, or manipulate data stored in the database.\n* **OS Command Injection:** Allows attackers to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the server hosting the application.\n* **Object Relational Mapping (ORM) Injection:** Exploits weaknesses in the mapping between object-oriented code and relational databases, enabling attackers to manipulate database queries.\n* **LDAP Injection:** Targets Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) servers, enabling attackers to bypass authentication or gain unauthorized access to directory information.\n* **Expression Language (EL) or Object Graph Navigation Library (OGNL) Injection:** Targets applications that use expression languages or object graph navigation libraries, potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code or access sensitive data.\n\nSource code review is crucial in identifying vulnerabilities to these injection attacks. By examining the code, security analysts can:\n\n* **Identify points where user input is directly used in queries or commands:** This highlights potential entry points for injection attacks.\n* **Analyze how data is sanitized and validated:** Proper sanitization and validation mechanisms can prevent malicious data from being injected into queries or commands.\n* **Review the implementation of security controls:** Security controls, such as parameterized queries and input validation, can mitigate injection vulnerabilities.\n* **Identify potential vulnerabilities in third-party libraries:** Injection vulnerabilities can often be found in third-party libraries used by the application. \n\nBy performing comprehensive source code review, developers and security professionals can proactively identify and address injection vulnerabilities before they are exploited by attackers.","8":"More dangerous attacks could modify or delete data from the accounts table, potentially corrupting or destroying valuable information. They could also invoke stored procedures, which are sets of pre-compiled SQL code that can perform various actions, potentially causing significant damage or disruption to the system.","9":"Detailed error messages, especially stack traces, can expose sensitive information such as:\n\n* **Internal file paths:** Revealing the directory structure of the application could allow an attacker to understand the application's architecture and potentially target specific files for exploitation.\n* **Database queries:** Error messages often contain snippets of SQL queries, which could expose database structure, table names, and even sensitive data within the database.\n* **Component versions:** Exposing versions of libraries, frameworks, or operating systems could enable attackers to target known vulnerabilities in those components.\n* **Configuration settings:** Sensitive configuration information such as API keys, database credentials, or connection strings could be inadvertently revealed in error messages.\n* **Code snippets:** Stack traces can expose portions of the application's source code, potentially allowing attackers to understand the application's logic and identify vulnerabilities.\n\nThese vulnerabilities, combined with the access control flaw, could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data or even take control of the application. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, attackers could potentially:\n\n* **Gain unauthorized access to sensitive data:** They might be able to read, modify, or delete confidential information stored in the database or other files.\n* **Execute arbitrary code:** If the application server's code is exposed through error messages, attackers could potentially exploit these code snippets to execute malicious code on the server.\n* **Gain remote code execution:** In some cases, error messages could expose vulnerabilities that allow attackers to execute commands directly on the server, providing them with complete control.\n* **Bypass authentication mechanisms:** Attackers could exploit the revealed information to bypass authentication measures and gain access to restricted functionality.","10":"A penetration tester discovering insecure security settings in application servers and databases could exploit various vulnerabilities, leveraging the provided context: \n\n* **Default Credentials:** Exploiting default accounts and passwords unchanged poses a significant risk. Attackers can easily gain unauthorized access, potentially escalating privileges to gain full control of the system.\n* **Insecure Error Handling:** Overly informative error messages revealing stack traces or sensitive information can be exploited for code injection attacks, allowing malicious code to be executed within the application.\n* **Disabled or Misconfigured Security Features:** Attackers could exploit disabled or poorly configured security features in upgraded systems, bypassing security mechanisms and gaining unauthorized access.\n* **Insecure Configuration:** The lack of secure configuration settings in application servers, frameworks, libraries, and databases presents numerous vulnerabilities. These could include weak encryption algorithms, outdated security patches, and open ports, allowing attackers to gain access, steal sensitive data, or launch denial-of-service attacks.\n* **Missing or Insecure Security Headers:** The absence of essential security headers or their insecure configuration could lead to various vulnerabilities like Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Clickjacking, and insecure communication, making the application susceptible to attacks.","11":"Relying solely on password complexity and rotation creates several vulnerabilities. While these measures may deter basic attacks, they are insufficient in the face of advanced threats. Here's why:\n\n* **Weak Passwords:** Even complex passwords can be easily cracked through brute force attacks, especially if users are forced to rotate them frequently. This often leads to predictable patterns and weak password choices. \n* **Password Reuse:** Users often reuse the same or similar passwords across multiple accounts. A breach in one system can compromise access to others. \n* **Social Engineering:** Password complexity doesn't protect against social engineering attacks, where attackers trick users into revealing their credentials. \n* **Lack of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):** Password rotation and complexity alone don't address the inherent weaknesses of passwords. MFA adds a second layer of security, requiring additional verification beyond a password. \n\nBy relying solely on these measures, organizations create a false sense of security. Adopting a layered approach to authentication, including MFA and robust password management practices, is crucial for mitigating risks.","12":"To protect sensitive data like passwords and financial information during transmission and storage, implementing robust security measures is crucial. Here are some key steps: \n\n1. **Encryption:** Encrypt data both in transit and at rest using strong encryption algorithms like AES-256. For transmission, HTTPS with TLS\/SSL should be used. This ensures that even if data is intercepted, it remains unreadable.\n\n2. **Secure Storage:** Implement secure storage solutions for sensitive data. This includes using encrypted databases, file systems, and storage devices. Access control mechanisms should be in place to limit access to authorized personnel only.\n\n3. **Strong Authentication:** Implement strong authentication mechanisms such as multi-factor authentication (MFA) to verify user identity. MFA adds an extra layer of security, making it much harder for unauthorized individuals to access sensitive data.\n\n4. **Data Minimization:** Store only the necessary data and avoid collecting or storing sensitive information that is not essential for business operations. This minimizes the risk of data breaches and reduces the potential impact.\n\n5. **Regular Security Assessments:** Conduct regular security assessments, including penetration testing, to identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses in your systems and security controls. These assessments help ensure that your security measures remain effective against evolving threats.\n\n6. **Employee Training:** Educate employees about security best practices, including proper data handling, strong password management, and recognizing phishing attacks. Training helps reduce the risk of human error, which can lead to data breaches.\n\n7. **Data Loss Prevention (DLP):** Implement data loss prevention (DLP) solutions to detect and prevent sensitive data from leaving the organization's controlled environment without authorization. DLP can monitor data in transit, at rest, and in use, helping to prevent accidental or malicious data leaks.\n\n8. **Regular Patching:** Keep all software and operating systems updated with the latest security patches to address known vulnerabilities. Regular patching reduces the risk of exploitation by attackers.\n\n9. **Secure Configuration:** Configure all systems and applications securely, following security best practices. This includes disabling unnecessary services, implementing strong access controls, and using secure configurations recommended by security vendors.\n\nBy implementing these security measures, organizations can significantly reduce the risk of data breaches and protect sensitive data from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction.","13":"The application's inability to detect and respond to real-time attacks despite penetration tests and DAST scans not triggering alerts highlights a significant security vulnerability. The issue lies in the lack of appropriate alerting thresholds and response escalation processes, rendering the application effectively blind to malicious activity. This vulnerability is compounded by the fact that logging and alerting events are potentially visible to unauthorized users or attackers, further increasing the risk of information leakage. To address this, the application must implement robust security controls such as: \n\n1. **Establishing Realistic Alerting Thresholds**: Define clear and sensitive thresholds for triggering alerts based on potential attack patterns and indicators of compromise (IOCs). \n2. **Implementing Effective Response Escalation Processes**: Define a clear and efficient escalation process for handling security alerts, involving appropriate security teams and personnel. \n3. **Enhancing Logging and Monitoring**: Implement robust logging and monitoring mechanisms that capture detailed information about user activity, network traffic, and system events. \n4. **Implementing Real-Time Threat Detection and Response**: Integrate real-time threat detection and response solutions that can analyze network traffic, detect suspicious activity, and trigger automated responses to mitigate attacks. \n5. **Securing Logging and Alerting Mechanisms**: Ensure that logging and alerting mechanisms are adequately secured to prevent unauthorized access and manipulation. \n6. **Regularly Review and Update Security Controls**: Continuously review and update security controls based on evolving threat landscapes and vulnerabilities. \n\nBy taking these measures, the application can significantly enhance its ability to detect and respond to real-time attacks, minimizing the risk of data breaches and information leakage.","14":"When applications fail to properly validate or sanitize user-supplied data, they become susceptible to various vulnerabilities, including:\n\n* **Cross-Site Scripting (CWE-79):** Attackers can inject malicious scripts into the application's output, which can be executed by unsuspecting users, potentially stealing their credentials or hijacking their sessions.\n* **SQL Injection (CWE-89):** Malicious SQL queries can be injected into the application, potentially allowing attackers to access, modify, or delete sensitive data from the database.\n* **External Control of File Name or Path (CWE-73):** Attackers can manipulate file names or paths, potentially gaining access to or modifying critical files, leading to data breaches or system compromise.\n\n**Mitigation Strategies:**\n\n* **Input Validation:** Always validate user input against expected formats and constraints. Use regular expressions, whitelisting, and blacklisting techniques to prevent unwanted characters or patterns.\n* **Output Encoding:** Encode all data displayed to the user, especially user-supplied content, to prevent malicious scripts from executing.\n* **Prepared Statements:** Use parameterized queries and prepared statements for database interactions to prevent SQL injection. This ensures that user input is treated as data, not code.\n* **File Path Sanitization:** Ensure that file paths are sanitized and validated to prevent attackers from accessing or modifying sensitive files.\n* **Secure Development Practices:** Follow secure coding principles and use secure libraries and frameworks that provide built-in protection against common vulnerabilities.","15":"The absence or misuse of cryptography presents significant vulnerabilities that can lead to sensitive data exposure. Here are some key weaknesses:\n\n* **Weak or Insecure Algorithms:** Using outdated or compromised cryptographic algorithms, such as outdated versions of DES or MD5, makes it relatively easy for attackers to break encryption, leaving data vulnerable. \n* **Poor Key Management:** Improper key generation, storage, and distribution practices can compromise the entire encryption process. Stolen, leaked, or easily guessed keys render encryption ineffective. \n* **Insufficient Key Length:** Using short key lengths (e.g., less than 128 bits for symmetric encryption) weakens the complexity of the encryption process, making it easier to crack through brute-force attacks. \n* **Improper Implementation:** Even strong cryptographic algorithms can be compromised by flawed implementations, such as insecure coding practices or failure to follow industry standards. \n* **Lack of Encryption for Sensitive Data:** Failing to encrypt sensitive data at rest (e.g., in databases, files) or in transit (e.g., over networks) makes it easily accessible to unauthorized individuals. \n* **Cryptographic Backdoors:** Intentional vulnerabilities or weaknesses built into cryptographic systems, often for law enforcement or intelligence purposes, can be exploited by attackers, negating the protection intended by the encryption.\n\nBy addressing these weaknesses through robust cryptography practices, organizations can significantly strengthen their defenses against data breaches and protect sensitive information.","16":"Integrating security specialists early in the software development lifecycle (SDLC) is crucial for building more secure applications. It allows for a proactive approach to security, embedding it into the core design and development processes. Here's how it contributes:\n\n* **Early Threat Identification and Mitigation:** Security specialists can identify vulnerabilities and potential attack vectors during the initial design phases, enabling developers to address them proactively. This reduces the risk of introducing security flaws later in the development cycle, when remediation can be more complex and costly.\n\n* **Secure Design Principles:** Security experts can guide developers in adopting secure coding practices and implementing security controls by design. This ensures that security is not an afterthought, but rather an integral part of the application architecture.\n\n* **Reduced Security Debt:** By involving security specialists early, organizations can prevent the accumulation of technical debt related to security vulnerabilities. This reduces the need for expensive and time-consuming security fixes during later stages of the SDLC.\n\n* **Improved Collaboration and Communication:** Early integration fosters collaboration between development and security teams. This leads to better understanding and communication regarding security requirements, resulting in more secure code and applications.\n\n* **Increased Awareness and Ownership:** Involving security specialists throughout the SDLC encourages developers to adopt a security mindset and take ownership of security responsibilities. This creates a more secure development culture within the organization.","17":"Penetration testers can assess the effectiveness of access control mechanisms in this scenario by conducting the following tests:\n\n1. **CORS Misconfiguration:**\n * **Test:** Attempt to access resources from a different origin (e.g., a different domain) using tools like `curl` or `Postman`. Analyze the response headers, particularly `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Methods`, to identify potential CORS misconfigurations.\n * **Expected outcome:** The tests should fail, indicating strict CORS enforcement, allowing only authorized origins or methods.\n\n2. **Record Ownership Enforcement:**\n * **Test:** Attempt to modify or delete records belonging to other users. Use tools like Burp Suite or ZAP to intercept and modify requests, altering the user ID or record ID. Observe if the system correctly blocks unauthorized actions.\n * **Expected outcome:** Access to records should be restricted to the owner, preventing unauthorized modifications or deletions.\n\n3. **Access Control Bypass:**\n * **Test:** Try to circumvent access controls through techniques like SQL injection, cross-site scripting (XSS), or authorization bypass vulnerabilities. Explore potential weaknesses in authentication, session management, and input validation.\n * **Expected outcome:** The application should successfully detect and mitigate these attempts, preventing unauthorized access and data manipulation.\n\n4. **Public Resource Validation:**\n * **Test:** Identify resources that are intended to be public and verify they are correctly accessible without any authentication requirements. Check for unnecessary access controls on public resources.\n * **Expected outcome:** Public resources should be easily accessible without any authentication or authorization requirements.\n\n5. **File Metadata and Backup File Access:**\n * **Test:** Try to access files like `.git` folders, backup files, or any sensitive configuration files that may be accidentally exposed.\n * **Expected outcome:** These files and directories should be properly protected, inaccessible from the web root. \n\nBy conducting these tests, penetration testers can identify vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in access control mechanisms, helping to ensure the secure and robust implementation of the stated security principles.","18":"Yes, if the application uses Java serialization to handle user state and the serialization process is not properly secured, an attacker could exploit this mechanism to achieve remote code execution. The Java Serial Killer tool is designed to leverage vulnerabilities in Java serialization, allowing attackers to inject malicious code into serialized objects. By injecting this malicious code, an attacker could potentially gain control of the application server, leading to a remote code execution attack.","19":"An **insecure design** refers to fundamental flaws in the architecture or blueprint of a system, making it inherently vulnerable to attacks. These flaws often stem from a lack of security considerations during the initial design phase, resulting in missing security controls or inadequate protection mechanisms. In contrast, an **insecure implementation** occurs when the actual coding or configuration of a system deviates from the secure design, introducing vulnerabilities despite a sound initial plan. This can arise from developer errors, misinterpretations of security requirements, or the use of insecure libraries or frameworks. The key difference lies in their root causes and remedies. Insecure design requires a complete redesign or significant architectural changes to fix the fundamental vulnerabilities. Insecure implementation, on the other hand, can be addressed by patching, re-coding, or reconfiguring the system to align with the intended security design.","20":"Rate limiting API and controller access helps mitigate the impact of automated attacks by setting limits on the number of requests that can be made from a single IP address or user agent within a given timeframe. This prevents attackers from flooding the system with requests, overwhelming the resources and causing denial of service (DoS) attacks. By limiting the number of requests, attackers are unable to exhaust system resources and cause significant damage.","21":"Leaving default accounts unchanged in an admin console presents significant security risks. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by using readily available default credentials to gain unauthorized access. Once they log in, they can potentially take control of the system, modify configurations, steal sensitive data, or even launch further attacks. This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it provides attackers with a straightforward entry point into the system without needing to bypass any security measures.","22":"During refinement sessions, threat modeling can be used to identify potential security risks associated with changes in data flows and access controls within a user story. By analyzing the proposed changes, security experts can identify potential vulnerabilities, such as unauthorized access, data breaches, or denial-of-service attacks. The threat modeling process can help to ensure that the user story is designed and implemented in a secure manner. For example, if a user story involves changing the way data is stored or accessed, threat modeling can help to identify potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers. This information can then be used to inform the design and implementation of the user story, ensuring that the necessary security controls are in place to mitigate these risks. By integrating threat modeling into the refinement process, organizations can proactively address potential security risks and ensure that their applications are secure.","23":"Using hard-coded passwords, weak cryptographic algorithms, and insufficient entropy in data protection poses severe security risks, especially when handling sensitive information like financial data or personal records. Here's a breakdown of the implications:\n\n* **CWE-259: Use of Hard-coded Password:** Hard-coded passwords are easily discoverable by attackers, compromising the security of the entire system. If the code is compromised, attackers can gain access to sensitive data without needing to crack complex passwords. This is a significant risk for applications, databases, or any system where hard-coded credentials are present.\n\n* **CWE-327: Broken or Risky Crypto Algorithm:** Employing outdated or insecure cryptographic algorithms makes data vulnerable to various attacks. Attackers can exploit weaknesses in these algorithms to decrypt sensitive data, potentially leading to breaches, data theft, and financial losses. This is particularly critical for data encryption at rest and in transit, as weak algorithms can easily be broken by sophisticated attackers.\n\n* **CWE-331: Insufficient Entropy:** Insufficient entropy in data protection methods, such as passwords or encryption keys, weakens the security of the system. Attackers can leverage statistical analysis or brute-force techniques to guess the keys or passwords, compromising the data they protect. This is a major concern for data encryption, where low entropy keys can be easily cracked, exposing sensitive data.\n\n**Consequences for Sensitive Data:**\n\n* **Data Breaches:** These vulnerabilities expose sensitive data, leading to breaches that compromise financial information, personal records, and other sensitive details. This can result in identity theft, financial fraud, and reputational damage.\n\n* **Non-compliance with Regulations:** Failure to implement robust security measures, including strong passwords, secure encryption algorithms, and sufficient entropy, violates data protection regulations like GDPR and PCI DSS. This can lead to hefty fines and penalties.\n\n* **Loss of Trust and Customer Confidence:** Data breaches erode trust in organizations and can significantly impact customer relationships. Businesses can lose customers and suffer reputational damage due to security failures, leading to financial losses.\n\n**Mitigation:**\n\nTo mitigate these risks, organizations must prioritize robust security practices, including:\n\n* **Eliminating Hard-coded Passwords:** Replace hard-coded passwords with secure password management systems or secret management tools.\n\n* **Using Strong Cryptographic Algorithms:** Implement industry-standard encryption algorithms like AES-256 for data protection. Regularly update to the latest and strongest algorithms as vulnerabilities are discovered.\n\n* **Ensuring Sufficient Entropy:** Employ strong password policies that enforce sufficient entropy, including length, complexity, and a mix of characters. Generate high-entropy keys for encryption, ensuring strong protection against brute-force attacks.\n\nBy adhering to these best practices, organizations can significantly reduce their vulnerability to attacks and ensure the protection of sensitive data.","24":"The 'Broken Authentication' category in the Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) encompasses vulnerabilities related to identification failures, which occur when an application fails to properly verify the identity of a user. Some examples of CWEs that fall under this category and relate to identification failures include:\n\n* **CWE-297: Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch:** This CWE arises when an application fails to adequately validate the certificate presented by a client, allowing an attacker to impersonate a legitimate user or server. This can happen when the application does not check the certificate's host name against the expected domain name.\n* **CWE-287: Improper Authentication:** This CWE describes scenarios where an application utilizes weak or flawed authentication mechanisms, making it easier for attackers to bypass authentication controls. Examples include using easily guessable passwords, weak password complexity requirements, or relying solely on username\/password combinations without additional security measures.\n* **CWE-384: Session Fixation:** This CWE occurs when an application allows an attacker to manipulate a user's session ID, potentially allowing them to hijack the user's session or gain unauthorized access to sensitive information. This can happen if the application does not properly generate or manage session IDs.\n\nThese CWEs highlight the importance of implementing robust authentication measures that effectively prevent identification failures. By addressing these vulnerabilities, applications can better safeguard against attacks that exploit weaknesses in authentication processes.","25":"If an unauthenticated user can access an administrative page, it poses a significant security risk. The attacker could potentially gain access to sensitive data, modify configurations, or even execute commands with administrative privileges. This could lead to a range of severe consequences, including data breaches, system compromise, and unauthorized modifications to the system.","26":"To effectively log login failures, access control breaches, and server-side input validation errors with sufficient user context for detecting malicious activity, the following steps are crucial:\n\n1. **Detailed Logging:** Capture comprehensive information for each event, including:\n * **User Information:** Username, user ID, group memberships, IP address, and location.\n * **Event Details:** Timestamp, action performed (e.g., login attempt, access request, input validation failure), resource accessed, and specific error message.\n * **System Information:** Server name, operating system, application version, and relevant configuration settings.\n\n2. **Structured Logging:** Implement a standardized log format that enables easy parsing and analysis by security monitoring tools. Common formats include:\n * **Syslog:** A widely used standard for logging system events.\n * **JSON:** Offers flexibility and human-readability for storing log data.\n * **CEF (Common Event Format):** A structured format supported by various security tools.\n\n3. **Log Encoding:** Encode log data appropriately to prevent injection attacks. Use secure encoding methods such as:\n * **Base64:** Converts binary data to printable ASCII characters.\n * **URL Encoding:** Encodes special characters for safe transmission over the internet.\n\n4. **Log Management Solutions:** Utilize robust log management tools that can aggregate, analyze, and correlate log data from multiple sources. These tools provide features like:\n * **Real-time Monitoring:** Detect suspicious activity as it happens.\n * **Alerting:** Trigger notifications based on predefined rules and thresholds.\n * **Data Visualization:** Visualize trends and patterns to identify potential threats.\n\n5. **Audit Trails:** Implement audit trails for high-value transactions to ensure their integrity. This could involve using append-only database tables or similar mechanisms to prevent tampering or deletion of log data.\n\nBy adhering to these practices, organizations can effectively log security events, gain valuable insights into suspicious activity, and respond promptly to potential threats.","27":"The rise in the OWASP Top 10 rankings for security logging and monitoring from 2017 to 2023 reflects a growing awareness of its critical role in detecting and responding to security threats. As attacks become more sophisticated, organizations need robust logging and monitoring systems to quickly identify malicious activity and take appropriate action. This is evident in the increased emphasis on security logging and monitoring by organizations and security professionals alike.","28":"Attackers can use automated tools like Shodan to identify systems with unpatched vulnerabilities like Heartbleed. Shodan searches for devices on the internet and can identify those still vulnerable to Heartbleed, which was patched in April 2014. Other examples of vulnerabilities attackers can exploit include CVE-2017-5638, a Struts 2 remote code execution vulnerability that enables the execution of arbitrary code on the server. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to compromise systems and potentially gain control over them.","29":"A common vulnerability that enables attackers to execute arbitrary code on a server is a **remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability**. An example of a high-profile breach attributed to an RCE vulnerability is the **Equifax data breach in 2017**, which was exploited through the **CVE-2017-5638 Struts 2 vulnerability**.","30":"During user story development, penetration testing can be integrated to identify vulnerabilities related to data flow changes and access control mechanisms by incorporating threat modeling into refinement sessions. This involves analyzing data flows and access control mechanisms to identify potential vulnerabilities. By simulating attacks and analyzing the impact, penetration testers can identify weaknesses in the system's security controls. They can then recommend solutions to mitigate these vulnerabilities, ensuring that data flow changes and access control mechanisms are secure and robust.","31":"Tools like **OWASP Dependency Check, retire.js, and versions** can be used to continuously inventory the versions of client-side and server-side components and their dependencies. These tools can be integrated into the development and deployment pipelines to automatically scan for vulnerabilities in these components. Additionally, you can continuously monitor sources like **Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) and National Vulnerability Database (NVD)** for vulnerabilities in the components. Software composition analysis tools can automate this process and provide alerts when vulnerabilities are discovered. Subscribing to email alerts for security vulnerabilities related to the components you use can also help keep you informed of potential risks.","32":"Common consequences of access control failures during a penetration test include unauthorized access to sensitive data, modification or deletion of critical information, and the execution of unauthorized actions or functions within the system. This can lead to significant financial losses, reputational damage, and legal repercussions for the organization.","33":"To improve the application's ability to detect and respond to active attacks in real-time or near real-time, even when penetration testing and DAST tools don't trigger alerts, you need to focus on enhancing the application's security monitoring and response capabilities. Here are some key steps:\n\n1. **Refine Alerting Thresholds and Response Escalation:**\n - **Define Clear Thresholds:** Establish specific thresholds for suspicious activity based on your application's risk profile. This includes setting limits for failed login attempts, unusual traffic patterns, and rapid data access requests.\n - **Implement Automated Escalation:** Configure automated processes to escalate alerts to security teams when thresholds are breached. This could involve sending notifications, triggering incident response protocols, or even automatically blocking suspicious IP addresses.\n\n2. **Enhance Runtime Security Monitoring:**\n - **Real-Time Threat Intelligence Integration:** Integrate your application with real-time threat intelligence feeds to detect known attack patterns and malicious actors. This can help identify attacks that may not trigger traditional alerts.\n - **Behavioral Analysis:** Implement behavioral analysis techniques to monitor user activity and identify deviations from expected patterns. This can help detect insider threats or malicious actors mimicking legitimate users.\n - **Security Information and Event Management (SIEM):** Use a SIEM solution to centralize security logs from various sources (application logs, network devices, firewalls, etc.). This provides a consolidated view of security events and facilitates correlation analysis for detecting complex attacks.\n\n3. **Implement Runtime Security Controls:**\n - **Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP):** Consider implementing RASP solutions, which can monitor application behavior in real-time and take immediate action to mitigate threats, such as blocking malicious requests or preventing data exfiltration.\n - **Web Application Firewalls (WAFs):** Use a WAF to filter malicious traffic at the network layer. Modern WAFs often offer advanced features like bot detection, API security, and real-time threat intelligence integration.\n\n4. **Secure Logging and Auditing:**\n - **Minimize Log Visibility:** Limit the visibility of sensitive information within logs and audit trails to prevent attackers from exploiting logged data. Consider using anonymization techniques or access control mechanisms.\n - **Secure Logging Infrastructure:** Protect your logging infrastructure from unauthorized access or manipulation to ensure the integrity and reliability of security logs.\n\n5. **Regular Security Assessments and Testing:**\n - **Penetration Testing:** Conduct regular penetration testing to assess your application's security posture and identify vulnerabilities that might not be detected by automated tools.\n - **Security Audits:** Perform regular security audits to review your application's configuration, code, and security controls for potential weaknesses and misconfigurations.\n\nBy implementing these measures, you can significantly enhance your application's ability to detect and respond to active attacks, even in situations where traditional security tools may not trigger alerts. Remember, continuous monitoring, analysis, and improvement are crucial to maintaining a strong security posture in the ever-evolving threat landscape.","34":"If an unauthenticated user can access pages intended for authenticated users, it poses a significant security risk. This vulnerability can allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, manipulate data, or even compromise the entire system. Here are some potential vulnerabilities:\n\n* **Data Breaches:** Attackers can access confidential data like customer information, financial records, or internal documents. \n* **Account Takeover:** Attackers might be able to hijack existing user accounts or create new ones with elevated privileges.\n* **System Manipulation:** Attackers could modify or delete critical system files, alter configurations, or execute malicious code, leading to system instability or complete failure. \n* **Privilege Escalation:** Attackers could exploit the vulnerability to gain administrator-level access, allowing them to control the entire system and potentially compromise other connected systems.\n* **Denial-of-Service Attacks:** Attackers could flood the system with requests, causing it to become unresponsive, making it unavailable to legitimate users.","35":"This scenario indicates a **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** vulnerability. An attacker could exploit this by providing a malicious URL that targets an internal system, bypassing firewalls and potentially accessing sensitive data or executing commands. The impact could include data exfiltration, internal system compromise, and denial-of-service attacks. ","36":"Failure of access control mechanisms during a penetration test can have severe consequences, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information, modification or deletion of critical data, and the execution of actions outside the user's permitted scope. This can result in significant financial losses, reputational damage, legal liabilities, and disruptions to business operations. The consequences can be even more severe if the penetration test reveals vulnerabilities that could be exploited by malicious actors.","37":"Building and deploying software within a secure software supply chain demands meticulous attention to several key security considerations. Here are some of the most critical factors to address: \n\n* **Secure Software Development Practices:**\n * **Secure Coding:** Implement secure coding practices throughout the development lifecycle, adhering to industry best practices and using static and dynamic analysis tools to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities. \n * **Code Review:** Conduct thorough peer code reviews to detect potential security flaws and ensure adherence to coding standards. \n * **Threat Modeling:** Proactively identify potential threats and vulnerabilities during the design and development phases, developing mitigation strategies accordingly. \n\n* **Secure Build and Deployment Processes:**\n * **Build Environment Security:** Securely configure build environments, preventing unauthorized access, code tampering, and malware injection. Implement robust access controls and utilize secure build tools. \n * **Dependency Management:** Carefully manage and scrutinize software dependencies, ensuring that all third-party components are vetted for vulnerabilities and security issues. Utilize a centralized dependency management system to enforce security policies. \n * **Automated Testing and Scanning:** Integrate automated security testing into the build process to identify vulnerabilities and ensure code quality. Implement static and dynamic analysis tools to detect potential weaknesses. \n * **Release Management:** Establish secure release management processes to ensure that software deployments are controlled, auditable, and free from unauthorized modifications. \n\n* **Secure Infrastructure and Deployment:**\n * **Secure Infrastructure:** Deploy applications on secure infrastructure, ensuring that servers, networks, and operating systems are properly hardened and secured. Implement appropriate access control measures and firewalls. \n * **Deployment Security:** Implement secure deployment practices, minimizing the attack surface and protecting against common vulnerabilities associated with deployments. Utilize secure deployment tools and automate the process as much as possible. \n\n* **Continuous Monitoring and Threat Detection:** \n * **Security Monitoring:** Implement continuous monitoring of applications and systems to detect suspicious activity and potential security incidents. Utilize security information and event management (SIEM) systems and intrusion detection systems (IDS). \n * **Vulnerability Management:** Establish a robust vulnerability management program to proactively identify and remediate security vulnerabilities in software components and infrastructure. Utilize vulnerability scanning tools and maintain up-to-date security patches. \n * **Incident Response:** Develop and practice an incident response plan to handle security breaches and incidents effectively. Define roles and responsibilities, ensure timely communication, and have a process for containment, recovery, and post-incident analysis. \n\nBy implementing these security considerations throughout the software supply chain, organizations can significantly reduce the risk of security breaches and ensure that their software is developed, built, and deployed in a secure and responsible manner.","38":"Attackers can exploit SQL injection vulnerabilities by injecting malicious SQL code into data inputs that are subsequently used to construct and execute database queries. This allows them to manipulate the database's logic, directly alter data, or even execute arbitrary commands within the database system.","39":"Returning detailed error messages, including stack traces, to users can expose sensitive information about the application's architecture, libraries used, and internal workings. This can be exploited by attackers to gain a deeper understanding of the system's vulnerabilities, leading to targeted attacks. Additionally, revealing stack traces could disclose the specific version of software components used, allowing attackers to exploit known vulnerabilities in outdated or unpatched libraries.","40":"The work factor or delay factor in adaptive and salted hashing functions like Argon2, scrypt, bcrypt, or PBKDF2 determines the computational effort required to calculate the hash. This means that by increasing the work factor, you significantly increase the time it takes to calculate a hash. This is a key security measure for protecting against brute-force attacks. A higher work factor makes it more time-consuming and expensive for attackers to try guessing passwords, effectively hindering brute-force attacks and enhancing password security.","41":"Attackers can bypass access control checks in web applications to gain unauthorized access in a number of ways. For example, they might modify the URL to tamper with parameters or force browsing, manipulate internal application state, or alter the HTML page. Additionally, they could use attack tools to modify API requests. Another tactic is to exploit insecure direct object references, which allow attackers to view or edit someone else's account by providing the account's unique identifier. Attackers could also target APIs with missing access controls for POST, PUT, and DELETE operations. Finally, elevation of privilege allows attackers to gain access to resources or perform actions beyond their authorized level.","42":"Exposing session identifiers in the URL and failing to properly invalidate them during logout presents significant security risks. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to hijack user sessions, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive data or actions. Here's a breakdown:\n\n* **Session Hijacking:** If an attacker intercepts a user's session ID, they can impersonate the user and access their account without needing valid credentials. This is particularly dangerous if the session ID is directly visible in the URL, as it can be easily captured by attackers using network sniffing tools.\n\n* **Session Fixation:** By manipulating a user's session ID, an attacker could force them to reuse an existing session even after logging out. This can be done by sending a malicious link to the user containing a specific session ID. When the user clicks on the link, they might be logged in as the attacker, even if they previously logged out. \n\n* **Credential Stuffing\/Brute Force:** If sessions are not invalidated properly, attackers can repeatedly attempt to guess credentials using stolen or leaked credentials lists without the risk of being detected. This can be especially problematic in systems with weak password policies or where users reuse the same password across multiple accounts. \n\n* **Persistence of Access:** Failing to invalidate sessions during logout or inactivity can allow attackers to maintain access to an account even after a user has left the system. This could allow them to monitor user activity, steal sensitive information, or perform actions on the user's behalf without their knowledge. \n\n* **Denial-of-Service (DoS):** Attackers can use session IDs to launch DoS attacks by flooding the server with requests, overwhelming its resources and making the application unavailable to legitimate users. This is possible if the application relies on session data that is not properly managed and can be abused by attackers.","43":"Recommended hashing functions for storing passwords include Argon2, scrypt, bcrypt, and PBKDF2. These algorithms are considered strong due to their adaptive nature, use of salt, and work factor (delay factor). When choosing a hashing function, consider factors like:\n\n* **Security:** The algorithm should be resistant to known attacks, such as brute-force and rainbow table attacks. \n* **Performance:** The function should be efficient enough to handle the workload of your system without causing significant delays. \n* **Flexibility:** The algorithm should allow for adjustments to the work factor, salt length, and other parameters to adapt to changes in computing power and attack techniques. \n* **Availability:** The algorithm should be widely supported and implemented in your chosen programming language and environment.","44":"Tools like **versions**, **OWASP Dependency Check**, and **retire.js** can help with continuously inventorying client-side and server-side component versions and their dependencies. For monitoring vulnerabilities, utilize resources like **Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE)** and **National Vulnerability Database (NVD)**. Software composition analysis tools automate this process, and subscribing to email alerts for vulnerabilities related to your components is crucial. Always procure components from official sources over secure links.","45":"The provided context suggests that the application may be vulnerable to padding oracle attacks if deprecated cryptographic padding methods like PKCS number 1 v1.5 are being used. This is because these methods are known to have security flaws that can be exploited by attackers to decrypt encrypted data. Padding oracle attacks occur when an attacker can observe the response of the application to different padding values. This information can then be used to decrypt the ciphertext. It is important to note that the provided context does not state definitively whether PKCS number 1 v1.5 is in use. Further investigation is needed to determine if the application is vulnerable to this type of attack.","46":"This is a vulnerability called **authentication bypass**. This means that the application's security mechanisms are failing to properly identify and verify users before granting access to restricted resources.","47":"A secure development lifecycle (SDL) encompasses several key elements, including secure design patterns, a paved road methodology, a secured component library, relevant tooling, and threat modeling. Involving security specialists from the very beginning of a software project is crucial because it allows for proactive security considerations throughout the development process. This early engagement enables them to identify and address security vulnerabilities in the design phase, reducing the risk of costly remediation efforts later on. By integrating security into the core of the development process, the SDL ensures the creation of more robust and secure software.","48":"Yes, if an attacker could force a user to browse to \"https:\/\/example.com\/app\/accountInfo?acct=notmyacct\", they could potentially access sensitive account information without proper authorization. This is because the URL contains a parameter \"acct\" which is likely used to identify the account being accessed. By manipulating this parameter, the attacker could potentially gain access to another user's account information. However, the attacker may not have access to any admin pages or administrative privileges. This would depend on the application's security measures and how sensitive information is handled.","49":"The vulnerability demonstrated in both attack scenarios is **SQL Injection**. The attacker exploits this vulnerability by manipulating the input parameter 'id' with a malicious SQL statement. The crafted SQL statement includes the command 'SLEEP(10)', which causes the database to pause for 10 seconds before executing the rest of the query. This delay disrupts the application's operation, potentially causing performance issues, slow response times, or even denial-of-service conditions. The attacker may also insert additional malicious SQL code to gain unauthorized access to the database, steal sensitive information, or modify existing data."}} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/test/benchmarks/rag/tmp_metrics.json b/test/benchmarks/rag/tmp_metrics.json deleted file mode 100644 index f6756fc..0000000 --- a/test/benchmarks/rag/tmp_metrics.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -{"context_recall":{"0":1.0,"1":1.0,"2":1.0,"3":0.7,"4":1.0,"5":1.0,"6":1.0,"7":1.0,"8":1.0,"9":1.0,"10":1.0,"11":1.0,"12":1.0,"13":1.0,"14":0.7,"15":1.0,"16":1.0,"17":1.0,"18":1.0,"19":1.0,"20":0.7,"21":1.0,"22":1.0,"23":0.7,"24":1.0,"25":1.0,"26":1.0,"27":1.0,"28":0.7,"29":1.0,"30":1.0,"31":1.0,"32":1.0,"33":1.0,"34":1.0,"35":1.0,"36":1.0,"37":1.0,"38":1.0,"39":1.0,"40":0.7,"41":1.0,"42":1.0,"43":1.0,"44":1.0,"45":0.3,"46":1.0,"47":1.0,"48":1.0,"49":0.3},"context_precision":{"0":1.0,"1":1.0,"2":1.0,"3":0.3,"4":1.0,"5":1.0,"6":1.0,"7":1.0,"8":1.0,"9":1.0,"10":0.7,"11":1.0,"12":1.0,"13":1.0,"14":1.0,"15":1.0,"16":1.0,"17":1.0,"18":1.0,"19":1.0,"20":1.0,"21":1.0,"22":1.0,"23":1.0,"24":1.0,"25":1.0,"26":1.0,"27":1.0,"28":0.7,"29":1.0,"30":1.0,"31":1.0,"32":1.0,"33":1.0,"34":1.0,"35":1.0,"36":1.0,"37":1.0,"38":1.0,"39":1.0,"40":1.0,"41":1.0,"42":1.0,"43":1.0,"44":1.0,"45":0.7,"46":1.0,"47":1.0,"48":1.0,"49":1.0}} \ No newline at end of file