Like academicians anywhere else, academicians at Canadian universities need funding to build and maintain research groups and publish research papers for career advancement. Conflicts arise when the funding is provided by a state-directed company of an autocratic foreign state. Academicians that take funding from such a company wittingly or unwittingly become "captured" by the state-directed company. Over time these academicians become available to speak on behalf of the foreign state and the state-directed company.
This process of decision-makers becoming obligated to a foreign state or the foreign state's proxies is called "elite capture." In the case of Canada, academicians at several universities appear to be in the process of being captured by Huawei.
The general process of elite capture as used by China follows a feed-capture-use pattern.
First, an agent working on behalf of the Chinese government supplies the target with resources that they want or need. Examples include all expenses paid trips to China, job offers, consulting contracts, and business deals.
Second, the agent makes the target dependent on China in some way. For example, the agent may provide continued facilitation to progress a business deal or assist the target in maintaining a job or a consulting arrangement.
Finally, the agent calls in a favor from the target. Examples include:
- Speaking in favor of the Chinese government or its policies in a public forum.
- Writing a favorable editorial (opinion) column.
- Giving media outlets China-favorable interviews.
- Providing access to privileged resources under the control of the target.
[1] describes Huawei's attempt to recruit a computer science (artificial intelligence) academician that follows the template mentioned above. Huawei first attempted to recruit the academician into a research project in China with lax privacy and data protection guidelines. When the academician declined, Huawei's subsidiary in Canada offered to hire the academician as a consultant at three times his university salary. Huawei Canada also offered to provide research grants and allow the academician to maintain his job at the university.
The academician sensed that taking the Huawei offer would make him dependent on Huawei. Once he accepted the funds and hired Ph.D. students to conduct research, the academician would be beholden to Huawei for continued research funding for his Ph.D. students. Such "capture" would reduce the academician's ability to steer his research away from ethically problematic data or to speak out against Huawei in case of an ethics violation.
The academician declined Huawei's offer to prevent himself from being captured.
As of this writing, unlike the U.S. and Australia, Canada lacks laws to identify the extent of Chinese operations in Canada. Even though Canadian intelligence services have warned the Canadian government of escalating Chinese operations in Canada, the Canadian government has not responded with new laws or regulations. The non-response may be partly due to "elite capture" among the lawmakers [2].
Separately, Canadian intelligence services have highlighted Chinese operations on Canadian universities [3]. Unfortunately, the Canadian government has not yet issued guidelines to Canadian universities on funding from foreign sources [4].
[4] lists 17 Canadian universities that have taken research funding from Huawei. This list includes the top-10 Candian computer science research programs [5]. As of 2019, Huawei had funneled more than 56 million Canadian dollars to these 17 programs [6].
The universities that received Huawei's research funds include the University of Waterloo, the University of British Columbia, and the University of Toronto. Public statements from these universities, touting their research funds from Huawei, point to an element of "capture" [7], [8], [9].
Since the Canadian government hasn't clearly specified constraints on foreign funding, semi-autonomous agencies (advertently or inadvertently) amplify Huawei's influence by matching Huawei's research funding with Canadian government funding [10], [11].
We reproduce a University of British Columbia academician's remarks to a Chinese state-directed news outlet below. The academician in question received research funding from Huawei. The academcian's remarks provide an example of the "use" to Huawei of a "capture" [12], [13], [14].
First, the academician complains that the U.S. government disallows mixing U.S. technology with research funded by Huawei [14a]: "Last summer the U.S. imposed restrictions on who is able to work, and under what circumstances, with Huawei … so now we have restrictions where we can't use U.S. technology in the research we do with Huawei." In the process, the academician ignores U.S. interests in the intellectual property produced: "Intellectual property generated by the research will be owned jointly by Huawei and UBC, although the university is not allowed to sell the technology to Huawei's rivals for a window of several years."
Second, the academician propagates a Huawei assertion that there is a distinction between a Huawei subsidiary in Canada and the company's base in China concerning data and intellectual property: "The funding comes from Huawei Canada, not Huawei China. That's an important distinction because Huawei Canada operates under the laws of Canada. Any time we share information they have to ask us if it's OK to share it with China. The information stays in Canada unless we agree to have it exported." Independent researchers, Canadian observers and U.S. government agencies have documented multiple cases where Huawei subsidiaries outside of China have acted on behalf of the parent company in stealing intellectual property.
Third, the academician repeats Huawei's assurance (not an independent study or reports from Canadian intelligence) that Huawei does not steal: "I have been given assurances [by Huawei] that Huawei is not stealing information and data from Canadian users. I don't have any reason to doubt that."
It is unclear if the academician fully understands that he has been captured by Huawei and is being used. Regardless, the propaganda value of the academician's statements to Huawei and the Chinese government is clear.
Over the years, many governmental [3] and non-governmental [1], [15], [16], [17] reports have warned Canadian organizations and institutions about inappropriate Chinese influence. However, there are no official Canadian government guidelines on when to (or when not to) take research funding from non-Canadian sources.
Academicians have chosen to hide behind the lack of governmental guidelines to claim that "they are following all government rules while accepting research funds from Huawei." Till recently, there has been no significant cost to being "captured" by Huawei in accepting Huawei's funds.
U.S. restrictions on Huawei operations at U.S. universities [9], detailed documentation on "elite capture" in Canada [1] and changing Canadian public opinion towards China [18] may yet cause Canadian academicians to look beyond Huawei for continued research funding.
[1]: In Plain Sight: Beijing's unrestricted network of foreign influence in Canada. Alliance CanadaHK. May 2021.
[2]: Why CSIS believes Canada is a 'permissive target' for China's interference. Sam Cooper. Global News. June 24, 2020.
[3]: Annual Report 2019, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Canada. 2020
[4]: Who benefits? Canada's top universities partner with Huawei. CBC News. November 26, 2019.
[5]: Canada's best university computer science programs: 2021 rankings. Maclean's. October 8, 2020.
[6]: Huawei funds $56M in academic research in Canada. That has some experts concerned. Peter Armstrong. CBC News. November 29, 2019.
[7]: Huawei and University of Waterloo Partner for World-class Research and Innovation. Huawei. November 11, 2016.
[8]: New Huawei and University of British Columbia Partnership Agreement to Advance NextGen Communications. P.R. Newswire. October 13, 2017.
[9]: The ethics of science research: reviewing U of T's funding from Huawei. Elisha Kelman. The Varsity. March 28, 2021.
[10]: Canadian government pairs universities with Huawei research funding despite security concerns. David Schwartz. Tech Transfer Central. February 23, 2021.
[11]: Canadian Government Partners with Huawei for High Tech Research at Universities. Neil Campbell. Vision Times. February 16, 2021.
[12]: Canadian university must thread needle between the U.S. and Huawei. Ian Young. South China Morning Post. January 10, 2020.
[13]: South China Morning Post. Wikipedia. (Retrieved on) November 7, 2021.
[14]: [12] identifies the academician as Lukas Chrostowski. South China Morning Post used to be an independent news organization based in Hong Kong. It is currently owned by the Chinese company Alibaba. Like all China-based companies, Alibaba is subject to direction by the Chinese government. Similarly, like all China-based news outlets, the South China Morning Post is subject to direction by the Chinese government. As of this writing, the South China Morning Post is no longer considered an independent news organization [13].
[14a]: To the best of this author's knowledge, U.S. restrictions on Huawei funded research apply only to U.S. based universities. Unfortunately, the academician makes a claim about his Canadian research being effected by the aforementioned U.S. restrictions without providing details.
[15]: How Canadian money and research are helping China become a global telecom superpower. The Globe and Mail. May 26, 2018.
[16]: Examining Huawei's Growth & Global Reach. China Institute, University of Alberta. August 2019.
[17]: Huawei & 5G: Clarifying the Canadian Equities and Charting a Strategic Path Forward. Christopher Parsons. The University of Toronto. December 8, 2020.
[18]: Poll shows hardening position on China among Canadians. Steven Chase. The Globe and Mail. October 11, 2021.
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