Guard against PKCS1 PEM-encoded public keys #277
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Should this also block ECDSA public keys? Or are those outright not supported? |
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Previous to this we were not correctly accounting for all PEM encoded public keys, like the PKCS1 PEM encoded format which is prefaced by
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----. This fix prevents symmetric/asymmetric key confusion attacks against users using the PKCS1 PEM encoded public keys, which would allow an attacker to craft JWTs from scratch.We've also added a deprecation warning when using
decode()and not specifying thealgorithmsparam. This will be required in a future release.