Adds protection against cross-site WebSocket hijacking using CSRF tokens #6
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amorey
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To protect against CSWSH attacks we need a way to identify cross-site requests and prevent them from connecting to the server. The easiest way to do this is by ensuring that the request Host and Origin are the same but unfortunately,
kubectl proxymodifies the request Host so we can't use this method. Another easy method is to check theSec-Fetch-Siteheader but unfortunately it isn't implemented in some popular browsers (see #3) so we can't use this method either. Instead, this PR uses the old-school method of CSRF token validation to identify cross-site requests and block them. After a WebSocket connection is made, the client is required to authenticate using the CSRF token value. If the token fails validation the connection is closed, otherwise it is allowed to continue.This PR also moves the GraphiQL playground interface to a static page accessible at /graphiql.