DRAFT: Stale Nomiations Reduce Voter Weight

[shawntabrizi]

In progress...

polkadot-fellows/RFCs#86

[shawntabrizi]

cc @Ank4n @kianenigma can you quickly sanity check that this entry point into the staking pallet would work?

[paritytech-cicd-pr]

The CI pipeline was cancelled due to failure one of the required jobs.
Job name: test-linux-stable 3/3
Logs: https://gitlab.parity.io/parity/mirrors/polkadot-sdk/-/jobs/6569933

[kianenigma]

This entry point would work but it is not the only option. What the code will do here is such:

despite you having 100 DOT in your Ledger, your staked amount that will end up in Exposure is increasingly reduced over time. Note that Exposure is the source of truth for slashing and rewards.

So eventually, a staker that is super idle is both exlcuded from slashing and reward. Is that desirable? The less amount "at risk of being slashed" also means less economic security. I would argue they should still be slash-able, but receive less rewards.

Also, a minor issue with this is that we might have more valuable nominators in the bags-list, but because the "decayed stakes" are not reported to bags-list. So, let's say the tail of the bags list is Alice and Bob, with stakes 120 and 100 respectively. Alice is the last item taken from the list, but once her decay factor is applied, her stake is actually 80, less than Bob. This is fixable and not a major concern.

Option 2, we can let the process of exposures creation as-is, and only reduce a portion of the nominator payout upon payout_stakers, would that work? Possibly this allows for more gaming, as payouts could be delayed.