Add support for wildcard SANs #84
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brandond
requested changes
Nov 20, 2023
| @@ -244,7 +239,7 @@ func populateCN(secret *v1.Secret, cn ...string) *v1.Secret { | |||
| secret.Annotations = map[string]string{} | |||
| } | |||
| for _, cn := range cn { | |||
| if cnRegexp.MatchString(cn) { | |||
| if validHostnamePattern(cn) { | |||
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I'm not sure this is correct, as populateCN is also called to add CNs extracted from TLS handshakes and HTTP host headers. Since validHostnamePattern calls validHostname(host, true), I believe this would allow unauthenticated callers to make dynamiclistener add wildcard SANs, if they spoof the correct value. I think wildcards should only be added if requested by the administrator.
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@brandond
This patch should fix k3s-io/k3s#7821
Note: The original way of checking the validity of SAN[1] is not consistent with x509 logic of Go's standard library. So I adapted it.
[1]: Go never use CN field of a X509 certificate to validate, it use SAN only.
https://github.com/golang/go/blob/631a6c2abfb2cf7a877ea80f98c504fc4e0077be/src/crypto/x509/verify.go#L109